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Abstract
Cooperative breeding is a social behaviour in which certain individuals will opt to delay or
forgo their own reproduction in order to help other individuals. Cooperative breeding is one
of the most conspicuous examples of cooperation in nature. However, theoretical understand-
ing of why this behaviour occurs is lacking and contradictory. In this thesis, I examine the
role played by ecological constraints on the emergence of cooperative breeding. Contrary to
previous results, I find that ecological constraints do matter, provided the population dynamics
are properly accounted for. I also examine the long-term evolutionary dynamics of cooperative
breeding, and obtain the optimal helping strategy from the perspective of both the helper and
breeder. I relate existing emergence theory to the predicted trajectory of the optimal strategy,
and examine the role of ecology and ecological constraints upon the optimal helping strategy.
Keywords: Cooperative breeding, adaptive dynamics, invasion analysis
ii
Co-Authorship Statement
Chapter 2 is based upon work co-authored with Dr. Geoff Wild, currently in press. Chapter
3 is based upon work co-authored with Dr. Geoff Wild, currently in preparation for publication.
iii
Contents
Abstract ii
List of Figures vi
List of Appendices vii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Cooperative breeding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.1 Explanations for cooperative breeding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.2 Evolutionary models of cooperative breeding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Inclusive fitness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Invasion analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
References 6
2 Ecological constraints and the emergence of cooperative breeding 10
2.1 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3.1 Dynamics of a selfish wild-type population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Local behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Global behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.2 Dynamics of invasion by a helpful mutant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4 Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4.1 Invasion fitness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4.2 Inclusive fitness effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4.3 Cost of dispersal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4.4 Breeder mortality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4.5 Auxiliary mortality and dispersal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.5 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
iv
References 28
3 Evolutionary dynamics of cooperative breeding 32
3.1 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.3 Wild-type population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.4 Evolutionary dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.4.1 Optimal strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.5 Ecology and ecological constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.5.1 Cost of dispersal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.5.2 Density-dependent effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Breeder mortality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.6 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
References 51
4 Summary and future work 55
4.1 Summary of thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.2 Future work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.2.1 Breeder-auxiliary conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.2.2 Co-evolution of helping and the sex-ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
References 57
A Derivation of mutant equations 60
B Higher-order evolutionary dynamics 63
B.1 Evolutionary stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
B.2 Convergence stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
References 65
Curriculum Vitae 67
v
List of Figures
2.1 A sketch of the rectangle Ω(M) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2 Relationship between cost of dispersal and the scope for the evolutionary emer-
gence of helping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3 Relationship between breeder mortality and the scope for the evolutionary emer-
gence of helping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.1 Effect of cost of dispersal on predicted optimal strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2 Relationship between the ecology, the ecological constraints, and the optimal
strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
vi
List of Appendices
Appendix A Derivation of mutant equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Appendix B Higher-order evolutionary dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
vii
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Cooperative breeding
Cooperative breeding is a social system in which certain individuals (auxiliaries) postpone
or forgo their own reproduction to help other individuals (breeders). Cooperative breeding
has been observed in a diverse array of taxa, spanning a wide variety of environments [1–4],
and as such, is one of the most conspicuous examples of cooperation in nature. In general,
the help provided by auxiliaries can be categorized as either functioning to increase breeder
survival or functioning to increase offspring production, the latter of which can be subdivided
as increases to breeder fecundity or increases to survivorship of offspring. Engaging in the
helping behaviour comes at a cost, typically paid by the auxiliary: for example, auxiliaries
could suffer higher mortality [5, 6], or a reduced likelihood of becoming a breeder [7].
1.1.1 Explanations for cooperative breeding
From a naive interpretation of natural selection, cooperative breeding seems somewhat para-
doxical. Since the action of helping comes at a cost to the helper, why would an individual
be willing to help? Indeed, it is for this reason that cooperative breeding is one of the most
widely studied social behaviours. The explanations for why cooperative breeding occurs can
be broadly divided into ultimate and proximate mechanisms. Proximate mechanisms include
the potential benefits of helping as a learning mechanism for offspring [8], as part of a social
hierarchy [9], or as a pathway to territory inheritance [10, 11], while ultimate mechanisms em-
phasize the role played by indirect fitness gains [12, 13]. Proximate mechanisms certainly play
a role in the emergence and maintenance of cooperative breeding, however, the focus of this
thesis will be on ultimate, evolutionary mechanisms.
While there are many evolutionary explanations for the emergence of cooperative breed-
1
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
ing, most focus on either ecological features or life history characteristics [12–15]. Life his-
tory theory focuses on an array of individual attributes such as reproductive rate, dispersal
and longevity [14–16]. On the other hand, ecological explanations focus on various envi-
ronmental attributes that form ‘ecological constraints’; these arguments are generally known
as the Ecological Constraints Hypothesis (ECH) [13, 17]. The ECH is arguably the most
prominent and empirically well-supported theory of cooperative breeding, particularly in avian
species [18–20]. The key attribute of the ECH is that limitations such as insufficient breeding
opportunities, low probability of finding a mate, low chance of successful independent repro-
duction, and high cost of dispersal cause cooperative breeding to be selectively advantageous,
promoting its emergence [13, 17].
Of course, many aspects of the life history hypothesis and the ECH are not mutually ex-
clusive, and there exists considerable overlap between the two schools of thought [16]. In
particular, both emphasize that helpers are simply helping in order to make the best out of a
bad situation [13, 14, 20], and that if given a viable opportunity to breed independently, they
would take it. As a result, both theories focus on the evolutionary emergence, rather than the
evolutionary maintenance, or long-term evolutionary dynamics of cooperative breeding. How-
ever, the general and intuitive nature of the constraints featured in the ECH should make it
relatable to the evolutionary maintenance under certain circumstances.
Another shortcoming of existing theory is that in general the focus is on the perspective of
the auxiliary (but see [17]). This ignores the potential for the breeder to shape, or otherwise
exert some control over, the auxiliary’s behaviour. When this occurs through the interaction
of the offspring with its mother, it is known as maternal effects [21]. While forcible retention
of auxiliaries by breeders is unlikely [17], breeders could exert control through, for example,
maternal hormones [21, 22]. Indeed, Russell and Lummaa [21] provide the example of cooper-
atively breeding meerkats (Suricata suricatta), who have varying levels of cortisol based upon
group size, levels which are correlated with the amount individuals help [23]. Russell and
Lummaa [21] suggest that cortisol could be transferred to developing foetuses, allowing the
mother to control the productivity of her offspring. The concept that breeders could exert some
control over offspring behaviour is important because it gives rise to potential breeder-auxiliary
conflicts [17, 21, 24]. When the costs of helping are paid asymmetrically by auxiliaries (e.g.
helping exposes helpers to higher mortality risks), the level of help that is ‘optimal’ for an
auxiliary will likely differ from that which is viewed as ‘optimal’ for the breeder.
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1.1.2 Evolutionary models of cooperative breeding
Numerous mathematical models have been used to explain the phenomenon of cooperative
breeding primarily by focusing on its evolutionary emergence [25–28]. A common draw-
back of these models has been a failure to explicitly account for population dynamics, a
modelling simplification which can yield unrealistic or inaccurate results [29]. More recent
work [29, 30], however, did examine cooperative breeding within a population-explicit con-
text. Leggett et al. [30] examined the emergence of cooperative breeding when helping acted
to increase breeder survival. Work by Pen and Weissing [29], looked at the role played by eco-
logical constraints and territory inheritence, when helping served to increase fecundity. Pen and
Weissing [29] found that the ecological constraints of the ECH do not matter, provided direct
benefits such as territory inheritance had been removed. However, their model violated specific
criteria of the ECH [13] (see Chapter 2 for detailed explanation). Moreover, there has been no
theoretical work studying the long-term evolutionary dynamics of cooperative breeding within
a population-dynamic explicit context, and existing work in general assumes auxiliary control
of helping (but see [17]).
In this thesis, I address two of these issues. In Chapter 2, I look at the role played by eco-
logical constraints upon the emergence of cooperative breeding, re-examining the conclusions
of Pen and Weissing [29]. I find that ecological constraints do matter when explicit popu-
lation dynamics are modelled, contrary to previous findings [29]. In Chapter 3, I study the
long-term evolutionary dynamics of cooperative breeding, and find the optimal helping strat-
egy. I do so under both maternal and auxiliary control of helping, illustrating the scope for
breeder-auxiliary conflict. I then relate the predictions made by the ECH for the emergence
of cooperative breeding to the predicted trajectories of the optimal helping strategy. In both
chapters, I assume the act of helping increases breeder fecundity, but comes at some cost to
the auxiliary (e.g. increased mortality, decreased dispersal). Before I begin, I introduce some
important tools that the remainder of the thesis relies upon.
1.2 Inclusive fitness
Inclusive fitness is a tool used to understand causal aspects of social evolutionary behaviours
[31–34]. Participants in social behaviours can be labelled as either actors (e.g. helpful aux-
iliaries) or recipients (e.g. breeders). Inclusive fitness focuses on the perspective of the ac-
tor engaging in the behaviour, and as such it represents a method of actor-centered account-
ing [31, 32]. Engaging in a social behaviour has consequences: in particular, the actor pays
a cost C, typically in terms of loss of its own reproduction, or direct fitness, and by paying
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the cost, the actor confers on another individual (i.e. the recipient) some benefit, B. Because
the process under consideration is an evolutionary one, each of these terms must be weighted
by relatedness coefficients between the actor and recipient of a particular action (i.e. R1 and
R2). Relatedness is measured as a statistical probability such that any two individuals in a
population selected at random should on average have a relatedness of zero [31–33]. As a
consequence, highly related individuals have a positive relatedness, while highly unrelated in-
dividuals have a negative relatedness. The reason that relatedness is measured as a statistical
measure is that while relatedness is often caused by genealogy, selection is indifferent to the
specific causal pathway [32]. Combining the above information allows us to arrive at what is
known as Hamilton’s rule, which can be written
R1C < R2B. (1.1)
When the inequality (1.1) is satisfied, the frequency of a behaviour in a population should
increase. Of course, Hamilton’s rule and inclusive fitness simply represent one accounting
methodology, and there are others [34]. However, as inclusive fitness interpretations are often
preferred by biologists [35–37], for accessibility this thesis will rely upon them to provide
evolutionary context.
1.3 Invasion analysis
An invasion analysis is a tool for studying phenotypic evolution. Its purpose is to find what the
conditions are for a rare mutant allele, say x′, encoding some novel strategy, to invade (i.e. not
go extinct) a monomorphic population of individuals practicing strategy x , x′. A monomor-
phic population implies genetic and phenotypic homogeneity. The monomorphic population is
often referred to as the ‘resident’ or ‘wild-type’ population. Moreover, it is assumed that the
trait continuously varies.
To illustrate this concept mathematically, suppose the density of the resident population at
time t is R, and that the dynamics of the resident population in the absence of mutants can be
described as
R˙ = f (x,R)R, (1.2)
where the dot denotes differentiation with respect to time. Let R¯ = n(x) be the locally or
globally stable ecological equilibrium of (1.2). Then by extending (1.2) to include the mutant,
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the resident-mutant population dynamics can be described as
R˙ = f (x,R; x′,M)R,
M˙ = f (x′,M; x,R) M,
(1.3)
where M denotes the density at time t of mutants practicing strategy x′. Now, an invasion
analysis supposes that since ecological processes occur on a much shorter time scale than evo-
lutionary processes, it is reasonable to assume that sufficient time has elapsed for the ecological
processes to be static. In particular, at the instance that the rare mutant enters the population,
the wild-type population is at or near a locally stable ecological equilibrium, R¯. Since the mu-
tant is rare, at the point of invasion we assume M = 0. This equilibrium, (R,M) = (R¯, 0), is
known as the mutant-free equilibrium (MFE). Then, to determine whether or not an invasion
succeeds, we need to consider the local asymptotic stability of this equilbrium. If it is unstable,
then invasion is possible, whereas if it is stable, the rare mutant will go extinct. The Jacobian
evaluated at the MFE for system (1.3) is
JMFE =
 R¯∂ f (x, R¯;x′, 0)∂R + f (x, R¯; x′, 0) ∗0 f (x′, 0; x, R¯)
 .
Matrix JMFE is triangular (in general, block triangular), so the entry ∗ does not affect the sta-
bility of the MFE. Moreover, the real part of the first entry is negative by assumption (because
the resident equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable). Therefore, the invasion function, or
invasion fitness is
λ (x′, x) = f (x′, 0; x, R¯). (1.4)
Biologically, (1.4) represents the growth rate of a rare mutant in a wild-type population at or
near equilibrium. If we are focused on mutant invasion into a selfish population (i.e. evolu-
tionary emergence; this is the focus of Chapter 2), then we are concerned only with the sign of
(1.4). That is, if it is positive, the mutant can invade. If negative, the mutant goes extinct.
If we are focused on predicting an optimal strategy (as in Chapter 3), then it is necessary
to treat (1.4) as a function, and the analysis becomes more complicated. First, an equilibrium,
or singular strategy is a strategy in which the local fitness gradient is equal to zero. Such a
strategy can be obtained by solving
∂λ(x′, x)
∂x′
∣∣∣∣∣
x′=x=x∗
= 0. (1.5)
The solution to (1.5) can be either a fitness minimum or fitness maximum. This brings us to
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our next definition, an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (or ESS; [38, 39]). An ESS is a singular
strategy, x∗, with the property that no nearby mutant strategy, say x′, where x′ , x∗, can
invade [38, 40]. The specific condition for assessing ESS is
∂2λ(x′, x)
∂x′ 2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
x′=x=x∗
< 0. (1.6)
Finally, if (1.5) is a non-linear function there is one remaining notation of stablity, which is
convergence stability [41]. In particular, a singular strategy can be considered convergence sta-
ble if selection corrects population-level strategy perturbations. The condition for convergence
stability is
d
dx
[
∂λ(x′, x)
∂x′
∣∣∣∣∣
x′=x
]
x=x∗
< 0. (1.7)
Of course, different combinations of (1.6) and (1.7) exist. If a strategy satisfies both (1.6) and
(1.7), the strategy is called a continuously stable strategy [40, 41]. Such a strategy is viewed as
a terminal point of evolution. A strategy that is ESS but not convergence stable is referred to as
a ‘Garden of Eden’ strategy; these are believed to be rare in nature. A strategy which satisfies
(1.7) but is not ESS is called an evolutionary branching point and is a site of potential genetic
polymorphisms or speciation events [42, 43].
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Chapter 2
Ecological constraints and the emergence
of cooperative breeding 1
2.1 Summary
Cooperative breeding is a social system in which certain individuals facilitate the production
of offspring by others. The ecological constraints hypothesis states that ecological conditions
deter individuals from breeding independently, and so individuals breed cooperatively in order
to make the best of a bad situation. Current theoretical support for the ecological constraints
hypothesis is lacking. In this chapter, I formulate a mathematical model that emphasizes the
underlying ecology of cooperative breeders. My goal is to derive theoretical support for the
ecological constraints hypothesis using an ecologically plausible model of population dynam-
ics. I consider a population composed of two kinds of individuals, non-breeders (auxiliaries)
and breeders. I suppose that help provided by an auxiliary increases breeder fecundity, but re-
duces the probability with which the auxiliary becomes a breeder. My main result is an invasion
condition that guarantees the evolutionary success of auxiliary help. I predict that increasing
the cost of auxiliary dispersal promotes the evolutionary success of helping, in agreement with
verbal theory. I also predict that increasing breeder mortality can either hinder the emergence
of help (at high population densities), or promote it (at low population densities). Overall, I
conclude that ecological constraints can exert influence over the evolution of auxiliary help
when population dynamics are considered explicitly; moreover, that influence need not coin-
cide with direct fitness benefits as previously found.
1A version of this chapter has been accepted for publication [1].
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2.2 Introduction
In many cooperatively breeding species, non-breeding individuals (i.e. auxiliary individuals)
postpone or forgo their own reproduction to increase the fecundity of others. Cooperative
breeders include a taxonomically broad set of species that occur in a wide range of environ-
ments [2–5]. Thus, the help provided by non-breeding auxiliaries represents one of the most
conspicuous forms of cooperation in nature.
The adaptive significance of auxiliary help is often explained in terms of its direct and
indirect fitness benefits [6–10]. Direct benefits of help accrue through the production of de-
scendant offspring. These are realized, for example, when a helpful auxiliary gains valuable
parenting experience [11], or when a helpful auxiliary contributes to the formation of a larger,
more productive group that it will inherit at some later date [7, 9, 12]. Indirect benefits of help
accrue through increased production of related, non-descendant offspring. For indirect benefits
to play a role in the emergence and maintenance of auxiliary help, helpers must be able to asso-
ciate with breeding kin [10]. While both direct and indirect fitness benefits likely promote the
evolution of helpful behaviour in cooperatively breeding species [13], I will focus on indirect
benefits here.
The indirect fitness benefits of auxiliary help can be realized in a number of ways, but the
most prominent explanation of how they accumulate is given by the Ecological Constraints
Hypothesis (ECH). The ECH proposes that the provision of help by auxiliaries is motivated
by the relatively small fitness returns that come from independent breeding attempts. In this
way, the ECH views an auxiliary’s decision to postpone independent reproduction in order to
help relatives as simply making the best out of a bad situation [14]. Importantly, the ECH
predicts that the selective advantage of auxiliary help is promoted by the high cost of dispersal,
low probability of establishing a breeding territory, and low expected fecundity of independent
breeders [15, 16].
While there is substantial empirical evidence to support the ECH [14, 17–20], comprehen-
sive theoretical support is lacking. Early theoretical work supported the hypothesis [16, 21, 22],
but did not embed key ecological features in a population-dynamic context. Consequently, the
predictions made by these early models do not necessarily correspond to any ecologically plau-
sible scenario. Pen and Weissing [23] were the first to address this limitation by modeling the
evolution of cooperative breeding with explicit population dynamics. However, they found
that in the absence of other effects, such as territory inheritance, the evolution of coopera-
tive breeding was independent of ecological constraints [23]. Not only does this result run
counter to empirical findings, it also suggests that the indirect fitness effects that feature in the
ECH only act to supplement the more important direct fitness benefits associated with territory
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inheritance. The objective of this chapter is to show that ecological constraints alone can in-
fluence the emergence of auxiliary help – and ultimately cooperative breeding – when explicit
population dynamics are taken into account.
In this chapter, I use a mathematical model to investigate the role played by ecological con-
straints in the emergence of auxiliary help. I find that the ecological constraints associated with
the cost of dispersal, probability of establishment and independent breeding success all play a
role in the emergence of cooperative breeding. As a result, I am able to provide ecologically
consistent theoretical support for an explanation of cooperative breeding that is widely used in
biology. I provide interpretations of my results in terms of inclusive fitness and equilibrium
population densities in order to make the predictions amenable to experimental testing.
2.3 Model
2.3.1 Dynamics of a selfish wild-type population
Consider an environment composed of a fixed density of breeding territories, K. Each breeding
territory can be inhabited by up to one breeding individual, and X ≡ X(t) ≤ K denotes the
density of breeders in the population at time t. Each breeding territory has a variable number
of non-breeding, or auxiliary, individuals associated with it, and so let Y ≡ Y(t) denote the total
density of auxiliaries at time t. Initially, assume that auxiliaries do not help breeders.
Breeders die at per-capita rate mX, and auxiliaries die at per-capita rate mY . Reproduction
is sexual, and breeders are outcrossing hermaphrodites. Breeders produce oocytes at per-capita
rate b, oocytes are immediately fertilized by sperm from a uniform random breeder in the
population, and the resulting offspring is immediately counted as an auxiliary on its natal patch.
The decision to model breeders as hermaphrodites was made for convenience and the results
will apply to dioecious species with an evolutionarily fixed pattern of sex allocation. Treating
the model species as outcrossed was intended to reflect the biology of the many cooperatively
breeding species that avoid inbreeding [24]. The decision to have newborn offspring join the
auxiliary class was made to keep the dimensionality of the population dynamics as low as
possible.
Auxiliaries disperse at a per-capita rate that is proportional to breeder vacancies, specifi-
cally d(K − X)/K, where d is the intrinsic rate of dispersal. A dispersing auxiliary successfully
establishes itself as a breeder with probability (1−c), where 0 ≤ c < 1 is the dimensionless cost
of dispersal. I assume that once a breeder is established, it remains to breed on its territory for
the duration of its life. Dispersal by breeders would not be adaptive because there is nothing to
be gained from leaving a territory that has already been secured.
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Combining the assumptions listed above, the population dynamics can be described as
dX
dt
= −mX X + d (1 − c) K − XK Y,
dY
dt
= −mY Y − d K − XK Y + b X.
(2.1)
To simplify the analysis, non-dimensionalize (2.1) by defining new variables x = X/K, y =
Y/K, τ = b t, µx = mX/b, µy = mY/b, and δ = d/b. It follows that (2.1) can be rewritten
x˙ = −µx x + δ (1 − c) (1 − x) y
y˙ = −µy y − δ (1 − x) y + x
(2.2)
where dots denote differentiation with respect to τ. System (2.2) always admits a trivial equi-
librium solution, (0, 0). I will establish the local behaviour of the system before analyzing the
global behaviour. First, define
R0 =
δ(1 − c)
(µy + δ)
1
µx
. (2.3)
The expression given by (2.3) is called the basic reproduction number; it describes the expected
lifetime reproductive success of an individual in a low-density population. The basic reproduc-
tion number is the product of (a) the probability of successful establishment as a independent
breeder at low population densities, δ(1 − c)/(µy + δ), and (b) lifetime reproductive success
through both male and female function, weighted by genetic contribution, (1/2)(2/µx) = 1/µx.
Local behaviour
Theorem 2.3.1 The trivial equilibrium solution to (2.2) is locally asymptotically stable when-
ever R0 < 1, and unstable whenever R0 > 1.
Proof The Jacobian evaluated at the trivial equilibrium is
J0 =
 −µx δ (1 − c)1 − (µy + δ)
 ,
and local asymptotic stability of (0, 0) can be assessed by applying the Routh-Hurwitz criteria
to this matrix.
It is clear that the trace of J0 is negative. If R0 < 1, then δ(1 − c) < µx(µy + δ), which
implies det J0 > 0, and it follows that (0, 0) is locally asymptotically stable. If R0 > 1, then
δ(1 − c) > µx(µy + δ), which implies det J0 < 0, and it follows that (0, 0) is unstable.
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If R0 > 1, system (2.2) also admits a positive equilibrium solution (x¯, y¯). Specifically, this
solution is
x¯ =
R0 − 1
R0 − δ/(δ + µy) ,
y¯ =
R0 − 1
R0
1
µy
.
(2.4)
By inspection, this solution exists in the positive quadrant if and only if R0 > 1.
Theorem 2.3.2 The positive equilibrium is a locally asymptotically stable, proper node when-
ever it exists.
Proof The Jacobian evaluated at the positive equilibrium is
J¯ =
 −µx − δ(1 − c)y¯ δ (1 − c) (1 − x¯)1 + δy¯ − (µy + δ(1 − x¯))
 =
 −δ (1−c)−µxµy µx (1−c)µy(1−c)−µx(µy + δ) (1−c)−µx(1−c)µy −(1 − c) µy(1−c)−µx
 .
I assess the local asymptotic stability of the equilibrium again using the Routh-Hurwitz criteria.
The trace of J¯ is clearly negative, and so to demonstrate stability it is sufficient to show
det J¯ > 0. If the positive equilibrium exists, then R0 > 1 which implies δ(1 − c) > µx(µy + δ).
It follows that det J¯ > 0, and the positive equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable.
To show that the positive equilibrium is a proper node, consider the discriminant of the
characteristic polynomial of J¯:
(
δ
(1 − c) − µx
µy
)2
+
(
(1 − c) µy
(1 − c) − µx
)2
− 2δ(1 − c) + 4µx(µy + δ)
=
(
δ
(1 − c) − µx
µy
− (1 − c) µy
(1 − c) − µx
)2
+ 4µx(µy + δ).
Since the discriminant is strictly postive, the positive equilibrium is a proper node.
Global behaviour
In this section I focus on the global qualitative behavior of solutions to system (2.2). First, I
show boundedness. Equation (2.2) indicates that the y˙ = 0 isocline can be represented by the
curve C = x
µy+δ(1−x) . This curve passes through the origin and the point (1, 1/µy). Moreover,
elementary calculus shows that C is increasing on the unit interval. Therefore, consider the
open rectangle
Ω(M) = {(x, y) ∈ R2 | 0 < x < 1, 0 < y < M},
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where M > 1/µy is arbitrary. When it exists, the positive equilibrium solution to (2.2) will
belong to the set Ω(M).
Theorem 2.3.3 The rectangle Ω(M) is forward invariant under solutions to (2.2).
Proof Taking the dot-product of 〈x˙, y˙〉 (from (2.2)) with vectors that are inward normal to the
boundary of Ω(M) yields:
〈x˙, y˙〉 x=0
0<y≤M
· 〈1, 0〉T = δ (1 − c) y > 0,
〈x˙, y˙〉 x=1
0<y≤M
· 〈−1, 0〉T = µx > 0,
〈x˙, y˙〉0<x≤1
y=0
· 〈0, 1〉T = x > 0
〈x˙, y˙〉0<x≤1
y=M
· 〈0,−1〉T = µyM + δ(1 − x)M − x > (1 − x)(1 + δ) ≥ 0.
It follows that the rectangle Ω(M) is forward invariant under solutions to (2.2).
The proof to Theorem 2.3.3 also shows solutions to (2.2) with initial conditions in the closure of
Ω(M) (clΩ(M)) remain trapped in this compact subset of R2 for all dimensionless time τ > 0.
This ensures the ω-limit sets of the solutions are non-empty [25]. I now turn to Bendixson’s
Criteria [25], to rule out the possibility that the ω-limit sets are composed of anything but
equilibrium solutions.
Theorem 2.3.4 The rectangle Ω(M) contains neither periodic solutions, nor compound sepa-
ratrix cycles to (2.2).
Proof Since right-hand side of the system (2.2) is continuously differentiable on Ω(M), and
since Ω(M) is a simply connected region of R2, Bendixson’s Criteria apply. Calculating the
divergence of 〈x˙, y˙〉, I obtain
div (x˙, y˙) = −µx − δ(1 − c)y − µy − δ(1 − x) < 0.
If follows immediately that no periodic solution or separatrix cycle lies entirely in Ω(M).
It is now possible to demonstrate the limiting behavior of solutions with initial conditions in
Ω(M).
Theorem 2.3.5 If R0 ≤ 1, then solutions with initial conditions in Ω(M) tend to the trivial
equilibrium asymptotically, whereas if R0 > 1 solutions with initial conditions in Ω(M) tend to
the non-trivial equilibrium asymptotically.
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(exists when R0 > 1) 
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Figure 2.1: A sketch of the rectangle Ω(M). This region is forward invariant under (2.2);
moreover, it contains the positive equilibrium whenever that equilibrium exists.
Proof The right-hand side of (2.2) is continuously differentiable on R2. By Theorem 2.3.3,
solutions to (2.2) with initial conditions in clΩ(M) are contained in this compact subset of
R2. By Poincare´-Bendixson Theorem it follows that the ω-limit set of such a solution is either
an equilibrium, a periodic solution, or a separatrix cycle. By Theorem 2.3.4, solutions with
initial conditions in clΩ(M) must tend toward an equilibrium. When R0 ≤ 1 only the trivial
equilibrium solution (0, 0) ∈ clΩ(M) exists. It follows that all solutions with initial conditions
in clΩ(M) must tend toward (0, 0) whenever R0 ≤ 1. If R0 > 1, then both the trivial and
non-trivial equilibria exist. Like the trivial equilibrium, the non-trivial equilibrium belongs
to clΩ(M), and no other equilibria occur in this set. Since R0 > 1 implies that the trivial
equilibrium is unstable, all solutions with initial conditions in clΩ(M) must tend toward the
non-trivial equilibrium whenever R0 > 1.
Theorem 2.3.6 (Corollary to Theorem 2.3.5) If R0 ≤ 1, then the trivial equilibrium is glob-
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ally asymptotically stable (GAS), in the sense that solutions with non-negative initial conditions
tend to this equilibrium asymptotically. If R0 > 1 the non-trivial equilibrium is GAS in the same
way.
Proof The Theorem follows from the fact Ω(M) was constructed using an arbitrarily large
M > 1/µy.
Therefore, provided R0 > 1, the dimensionless population densities tend toward the equilibrium
values:
x→ x¯ = R0 − 1
R0 − δ/(δ + µy) ,
y→ y¯ = R0 − 1
R0
1
µy
.
(2.5)
At equilibrium, the probability with which an auxiliary becomes established as a breeder is
given by ψ = δ(1− c)(1− x¯)/(µy + δ(1− x¯)), and reproductive success as a breeder is N = 2/µx.
Intuitively, lifetime reproductive success, weighted by genetic contribution at equilibrium is
unity, that is ψN/2 = 1.
2.3.2 Dynamics of invasion by a helpful mutant
Suppose that the extent to which an auxiliary helps the breeder on its natal patch is determined
at a single, diallelic autosomal locus. An auxiliary homozygous for the selfish, wild-type allele
provides no help, whereas an auxiliary carrying the mutant allele helps the breeder on its natal
territory by increasing the breeder’s oocyte production. Furthermore, assume that the mutant
allele is not recessive and is rare.
Because the mutant allele is rare, the success of a mutant invasion is determined entirely by
the success of heterozygous mutant individuals. Moreover, when the mutant is rare the dynam-
ics of the mutant subpopulation are approximately linear. Assuming the wild-type population
is near equilibrium (3.35), the dynamics of the heterozygous mutant can be described by the
equations
dXm
dt
= −mxXm + d˜ (1 − c) (1 − x¯)Ym
dYm
dt
= −m˜yYm − d˜ (1 − x¯)Ym + bXm + 12hZm
dZm
dt
= −
(
mx + m˜y + d˜ (1 − x¯)
)
Zm +
1
2
bXm +
1
2
hZm,
where Xm and Ym are mutant breeder and auxiliary densities respectively, Zm is the density
of mutant auxiliaries at breeding sites occupied by mutant breeders (see Appendix A for full
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derivation of these equations), and parameters accented by a tilde are the mutant analogs to
the wild-type counterparts. The parameter h is the rate at which helping increases the oocyte
production by a breeder. Non-dimensionalizing by letting τ = b t, and define µ˜y = m˜y/b,
δ˜ = d˜/b, and γ = h/b , then mutant invasion is described by the following linearized system of
differential equations:
x˙m = −µx xm + δ˜ (1 − c)(1 − x¯) ym,
y˙m = −µ˜y ym − δ˜ (1 − x¯) ym + xm + 12γzm,
z˙m = −(µx + µ˜y + δ˜(1 − x¯))zm + 12 xm + 12γzm.
(2.6)
Variables xm and ym in equation (2.6) denote the dimensionless densities of heterozygous breed-
ers and auxiliaries, respectively. The variable zm denotes the density of heterozygous auxiliaries
on territories occupied by heterozygous breeders. While these groups can also be formed be-
tween wild-type breeders and heterozygous auxiliaries, the effect of such groups on mutant
invasion is captured sufficiently by the equation for y˙m since they do not yield a benefit in
terms of production of subsequent mutant offspring. Note that the equation for y˙m includes
an input due to unassisted reproduction by mutant breeders represented by the term xm. To
better understand this term recall that the unassisted rate at which a breeder produces offspring
through both male and female function is 2. Since half of these offspring are mutants, the total
unassisted rate of mutant offspring production is (1/2) × 2 = 1, and so the total rate at which
mutant offspring are produced without help is 1 × xm = xm. With this in mind it makes sense
that the inputs in equation (2.6) associated with reproduction through female function only get
weighted by 1/2.
Equation (2.6) also contains re-scaled parameters δ˜, µ˜y, and γ. The parameter γ describes
the additive increase in the rate of oocyte ouput due to the presence of one mutant auxiliary. The
parameter µ˜y describes the per-capita mortality rate of a heterozygous mutant auxiliary. Finally,
the parameter δ˜ describes the rate at which a mutant auxiliary disperses at low population
densities.
Helping is energetically expensive [8]. To reflect this, assume that the provisioning of
help comes at the cost of some combination of higher auxiliary mortality (µ˜y ≥ µy) and lower
auxiliary disperal (δ˜ ≤ δ). In regards to dispersal, while helpers can disperse at a lower rate
than selfish individuals, the model does not force a lower dispersal rate on helpers. In other
words, the model allows for dispersal and helping to be treated as independent decisions—a
feature that has been advocated elsewhere [12].
In keeping with the ECH, auxiliary help in this model is not associated with territory in-
heritance. Territory inheritance and the associated effects of local kin-competition have been
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studied extensively elsewhere in the context of cooperative breeding and the evolution of help-
ing in general [23, 26–28]. Moreover, direct benefits, such as the parenting experience gained
by helpful auxiliaries, are neglected so as to focus solely on indirect benefits. Finally, note that
auxiliary help is provisioned over a variable period of time, in keeping with assumptions made
by previous authors [23].
2.4 Results and Discussion
2.4.1 Invasion fitness
System (2.6) admits a trivial equilibrium solution, which is the so-called mutant free equilibrum
(MFE). The stability of the MFE can be determined by using the next generation matrix method
[29, 30]. In essence, this method involves decomposing a non-singular matrix A, where A is
the constant matrix of (2.6), into A = F − V , where F and V satisfy three conditions: F ≥ 0,
V−1 ≥ 0, and the spectral bound of −V is s(−V) < 0. Provided these conditions are satisfied,
then ρ(FV−1) < 1 will guarantee that s(A) < 0. From a biological perspective, F is generally
a matrix containing new additions to the population and V is a matrix containing movement
between classes and loss of individuals, however for this chapter I will slightly deviate from
the traditional approach and will instead define F as new additions to each class and V as loss
of individuals from each class. Importantly, this definition does not alter the validity of the
method in any way. Proceeding in this fashion, the decomposition is
F =

0 δ˜(1 − c)(1 − x¯) 0
1 0 12γ
1
2 0
1
2γ

and
V =

µx 0 0
0 (µ˜y + δ(1 − x¯)) 0
0 0 (µx + µ˜y + δ(1 − x¯))

The fate of the mutant is then determined by the spectral radius of the next-generation matrix,
FV−1 =

0 δ˜(1−c)(1−x¯)
µ˜y+δ˜(1−x¯) 0
1
µx
0 12
γ
µx+µ˜y+δ˜(1−x¯)
1
2
1
µx
0 12
γ
µx+µ˜y+δ˜(1−x¯)
 ,
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denoted ρ(FV−1). If ρ(FV−1) > 1 the helpful mutant allele invades the population, and if
ρ(FV−1) < 1 it tends toward extinction. While obtaining an explicit condition for ρ(FV−1) is
possible, in this case it is not easily amenable to biological interpretation. Instead, suppose
that selection is weak. That is, the invading strategy only slightly deviates from the resident
strategy. Then, obtaining an condition for invasion is easy [31]. To do so, I must consider FV−1
in the absence of selection (i.e. when µ˜y = µy, δ˜ = δ, and γ = 0). In the absence of selection
the next-generation matrix becomes
F0V−10 =

0 ψ 0
1
2N 0 0
1
4N 0 0
 .
It is trivial to determine that ρ(F0V−10 ) = 1, and that this eigenvalue is associated with the
dominant right and left eigenvectors u = 〈ψ, 1, 1/2〉T and v = 〈N/2, 1, 0〉T , respectively. That
the dominant eigenvalue in the absence of selection is 1 is expected, as linear approximations
are expected to fail in this case.
Assuming weak selection, the mutant invades whenever
vTFV−1u > vTu ⇔ 1
2
N
δ˜ (1 − c) (1 − x¯)
µ˜y + δ˜ (1 − x¯)
+
1
4
γ
µx + µ˜y + δ˜ (1 − x¯)
> 1, (2.7)
and is eliminated whenever the inequality is reversed. In analogy to ψN/2 as described previ-
ously for wild-type individuals, the first term of (2.7) is the product of (a) the probability that
a mutant auxiliary recruits to the breeding class, δ˜(1 − c)(1 − x¯)/[µ˜y + δ˜(1 − x¯)], and (b) the
expected unassisted lifetime fecundity of a mutant breeder, weighted by the probability that
any one of the offspring it produces is a mutant, N/2. The second term of (2.7) is the product
of (a) the probability that the focal mutant was produced through the female function of its
mutant parent, 1/2, and (b) the expected number of mutant offspring the focal mutant helps to
produce during the time spent as a productive helper, (γ/2)/[µx+µ˜y+ δ˜(1− x¯)]. In particular, the
second term shows that the focal mutant will direct half of its help to producing non-mutants.
In some cases, the interpretations presented above assume that the mutant is selectively neutral,
but any discrepancies this introduces will be of no consequence because I have applied a weak
selection approximation.
2.4.2 Inclusive fitness effects
Regardless of the genotypic differences that might occur among nestmates, auxiliaries are al-
ways helping to raise kin (half-siblings), and so it is expected that the invasion condition will
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yield an inclusive-fitness interpretation. When the effect of selection is weak, a Taylor expan-
sion of the left-hand side of (2.7) about γ = 0, and assuming δ˜ ≡ δ˜(γ), µ˜y ≡ µ˜y(γ) with δ˜(0) = δ
and µ˜y(0) = µy, gives
1 +
1δ µyµy + δ (1 − x¯) dδ˜dγ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
γ=0
− 1
δ
δ
µy + δ (1 − x¯)
dµ˜y
dγ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
γ=0
+
1
4
1
µx + µy + δ (1 − x¯)
 γ
to first-order in γ. Note that to simplify the previous line the relation 12ψN = 1 was used.
Substituting the approximation back into the invasion condition (and using the quotient rule),
then when the effect of selection is weak, invasion occurs if
− 1
2︸︷︷︸
R1
ψN
δ
µy + δ(1 − x¯)
d(µ˜y/δ˜)
dγ
∣∣∣∣∣
γ=0︸                               ︷︷                               ︸
C
+
1
4︸︷︷︸
R2
1
µx + µy + δ(1 − x¯)︸                 ︷︷                 ︸
B
> 0 (2.8)
which is Hamilton’s rule [32], modified for cooperative breeders, R1C < R2B [6]. The first
term in (2.8) is the marginal reduction in reproductive success through independent breeding
incurred by the mutant auxiliary (C > 0), weighted by the relatedness between the auxiliary
and its potential offspring (R1 = probability that any offspring produced by the focal mutant
auxiliary would also be a mutant). The second term in (2.8) corresponds to the marginal benefit
of auxiliary help (B > 0), weighted by the relatedness between the helpful auxiliary and the
offspring produced via help (R2 = probability of the event that the mutant auxiliary was born
on the territory occupied by its mutant parent, and that any offspring it helps to raise on that
territory is also a mutant). Regardless of the interpretation used, the invasion condition (2.8)
can be rewritten as
1/(µx + µy + δ(1 − x¯))
1/(µy + δ(1 − x¯)) > 4 δ
d(µ˜y/δ˜)
dγ
∣∣∣∣∣
γ=0
(2.9)
or equivalently,
1
4
1
δ
µy
(1 − µx1−c )µx + µy
>
d(µ˜y/δ˜)
dγ
∣∣∣∣∣
γ=0
(2.10)
where I have relied on the fact that with weak selection γ is small and µ˜y ≈ µy and δ˜ ≈ δ.
Condition (2.9) shows that the model predicts that the fate of the rare mutant is influenced by
the tension between the expected amount of time spent as a productive helper (numerator, left-
hand side), and the expected time spent as an auxiliary (denominator, left-hand side). Condition
(2.10) shows the importance of ecological constraints. Specifically, it is clear that the ecological
parameters such as cost of dispersal, c, and breeder mortality, µx, that simplified out of Pen
and Weissing’s [23] condition for the emergence of auxilary help are present. Moreover, at
equilibrium the parameter µx can be interpreted as the probability of establishment ψ (this is
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because 1 = (1/2)ψN = (1/2)ψ (2/µx) = ψ (1/µx)), which is considered to be a key ecological
constraint of the ECH [15]. In short, the model reveals that ecological constraints do influence
the emergence of cooperative breeding.
Inequalities (2.9) and (2.10) also show that the invasion condition can be thought of as an
upper bound on the rate at which the immediate costs of mutant behavior are incurred when
mutant helping has a small effect on breeder fecundity. It follows that cooperation is promoted
(resp. hindered) as the upper bound is increased (resp. decreased). I now investigate the
specific effects of the ecological components of the model.
2.4.3 Cost of dispersal
Differentiating the left-hand side of (2.10) with respect to cost of dispersal, c, and maintaining
R0 > 1, it is clear that increasing the cost of dispersal promotes cooperation at a rate propor-
tional to
1
4
1
((1 − µx1−c )µx + µy)2
δ
µy + δ
µy
µy + δ
1
R20
(2.11)
(recall that R0 > 1 implies µx < 1 − c). Line (2.11) shows that the effect of increasing c
is strongest when R0 ≈ 1. This finding is also reflected in Figure 2.2 (top panel) where the
effect of increased c is most pronounced as R0 approaches 1 from above. In agreement with
the expressions in (3.35), my results show that the pronounced effect of c is associated with
moderate-to-low occupancy of breeding territories, and moderate-to-low densities of auxil-
iaries (Figure 2.2, middle panel, bottom panel). Therefore the model predicts that changing
the cost of dispersal is likely to have greatest influence on the emergence of auxiliary help in
populations exposed to moderate-to-harsh environmental conditions.
2.4.4 Breeder mortality
Differentiating the left-hand side of (2.10) with respect to the breeder mortality parameter,
µx, and maintaining R0 > 1, yields an expression whose sign is variable. This indicates that
changes to breeder mortality can hinder the emergence of auxiliary cooperation in some cases,
and promote it in others. Specifically, increasing breeder mortality hinders cooperation when
R0 > 2δ/(δ + µy), and promotes cooperation when the inequality is reversed (Figure 2.3, top
panel).
Biologically speaking R0 > 2δ/(δ+µy) (resp. R0 < 2δ/(δ+µy)) corresponds to a population
with relatively high (resp. low) densities. As a result, the model predicts that increases in
breeder mortality rate will hinder the emergence of cooperation in populations with relatively
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Figure 2.2: The scope for the emergence of help increases monotonically with the increas-
ing cost of dispersal c. The effect exerted by increasing c is weak when territory occupancy
rates and population densities are relatively high (i.e. when c is relatively small, and R0
is relatively large). The effect of c is more substantial as occupancy rates and population
densities decrease (i.e. as c increases, and R0 approaches 1 from above). In this figure
µx = µy = 0.1, and δ = 1, but the same qualitative relationships were observed at all
parameter combinations investigated.
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high population densities, but will promote cooperation in low-density populations (Figure 2.3,
middle panel, bottom panel).
As previously noted, mutant invasion hinges on the tension between time until a breeding
opportunity becomes available, and the benefits that can be accrued through help during that
time. Thus, increasing breeder mortality represents a double-edged sword for the emergence of
cooperation. Increasing breeder mortality reduces the time a helpful auxiliary spends waiting
for its own breeding territory, but also reduces the benefit auxiliary help confers on related
breeders during the waiting period. When the population is at high densities, waiting times are
already so lengthy that benefits associated with their reduction are small in comparison to the
concomitant costs associated with reduced time spent helping. When the population is at low
densities, the relationship is reversed.
At the equilibrium presented in (3.35) the parameter µx can be interpreted as the probability
with which an auxiliary becomes established as a breeder during its lifetime. This interpreta-
tion follows from the relation ψN/2 = 1. Previous work predicts that increasing the probability
of establishment will hinder cooperation, since larger ψ implies that helping is more costly
(i.e. more is being sacrificed by the helpful auxiliary) [16]. The fact that increasing ψ = µx
can sometimes promote and sometimes hinder the emergence of auxiliary help shows that the
relationship between ψ is more complicated than previously thought. In addition, the complica-
tions are compounded here because lifetime unassisted fecundity N = 2/µx decreases as ψ = µx
increases. Broadly speaking, these results illustrate a key advantage of pursuing ecologically
explicit accounts of evolution: these models are able to elucidate the complex interrelationships
among ecological parameters, where other less explicit models naively treat such quantities as
independent.
2.4.5 Auxiliary mortality and dispersal
(2.10) cannot be used to study the effect of changes in auxiliary mortality rate, µy, and dispersal
rate, δ, because µy and δ appear on both sides of the inequality. Therefore, we must collect all
terms in µy and δ on one side of the invasion condition. For clarity and convenience, I do this
by focusing on each trade-off independently. First, suppose that helping decreases the dispersal
rate of auxiliaries. In this case, the invasion condition is
1
4
δ
(1 − µx1−c )µx + µy
> −dδ˜
dγ
∣∣∣∣∣
γ=0
. (2.12)
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Figure 2.3: The scope for the emergence of help is affected by increasing breeder mortality
µx in a non-monotonic manner. When territory occupancy rates and population densities
are large (i.e. when µx is small and R0 large), increasing µx reduces the scope for help.
When territory occupancy rates and population densities are low (i.e. when µx is large and
R0 small), increasing µx increases the scope for help. The qualitative effect of increasing µx
changes when R0 = 2δ/(µy+δ), of course in those cases where 2δ/(µy+δ) < 1 such a switch
does not occur and increasing µx always inhibits help. In this figure c = 0.4, µy = 0.1, and
δ = 1, but the same qualitative relationships were observed at all parameter combinations
investigated.
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Second, in the event that help increases auxiliary mortality, the invasion condition is
1
4
µy
(1 − µx1−c )µx + µy
>
dµ˜y
dγ
∣∣∣∣∣
γ=0
. (2.13)
In the first case, increasing µy clearly decreases the left-hand side of the invasion condition
(2.12). Consequently, increases to auxiliary mortality inhibit the emergence of cooperation.
In the second case, increasing µy increases the left-hand side of the invasion condition (2.13),
and so higher auxiliary mortality promotes cooperation. Returning to (2.12), it is clear that
increasing δ increases the threshold for invasion of helping to occur. Changes to δ have no
impact in (2.13).
In general, it can be expected that δ˜ and µ˜y could trade off with γ in any number of ways.
Hence, increasing δ and µy will have a variable effect on mutant invasion—one that depends
on the nature of the trade-off.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
The ECH is an empirically well-supported explanation for the adaptive significance of coop-
erative breeding [14, 17–20]. By contrast, theoretical support for the hypothesis is equivocal.
Early theoretical work that supported the ECH treated key ecological parameters as fixed quan-
tities, effectively neglecting the ecological underpinnings of the natural systems in which co-
operative breeding occurs [16, 21, 22]. More recent work has taken ecological dynamics into
consideration, and has found that the emergence of auxiliary help is independent of the ecolog-
ical constraints featured in the ECH, when auxiliary territory inheritance is absent [23]. This
more recent result suggests that ecological constraints are of secondary importance to other
explanations.
In this Chapter, I present an explicit account of population dynamics, and use that account
to derive an ecologically reasonable measure of helper fitness. The model purposefully ne-
glects local factors such as territory inheritance, and direct benefits of helping such as gained
parenting experience, in order to focus solely on the importance of ecological constraints.
My main result is an invasion condition that can be expressed in terms of quantities that
relate directly to the ECH—specifically, cost of dispersal, c, and breeder mortality, µx. Ecolog-
ical constraints can influence the emergence of cooperative breeding without additional direct-
fitness benefits like territory inheritance. In particular, I find that increased cost of dispersal
acts as an incentive for auxiliary help, as originally suggested by Emlen [15, 16]. Changes to
breeder mortality (equivalently, probability of establishment ψ, at equilibrium) have a variable
effect that depends on the tension between the expected time spent as a productive helper on
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the one hand, and expected time spent in the auxiliary class on the other hand. Lastly, I find
that other life history parameters, such as auxiliary dispersal rate (δ) and auxiliary mortality
rate (µy), influence the emergence of cooperation; however, the effect of those parameters will
depend heavily on the nature of the fitness costs of increased helping.
I was able to frame my qualitative results concerning ecological constraints in terms of
the occupancy rate of breeding territories (x¯), and the density of auxiliaries (y¯). These results
indicate that the cost of dispersal exerts greatest influence in populations with low-to-moderate
occupancy rates, and low-to-moderate auxiliary densities. They also predict that increases to µx
will inhibit the emergence of auxiliary help in populations with high territory occupancy rate
and high breeder densities, and promote the emergence of auxiliary help as occupancy rates and
auxiliary densities fall. Lastly, the complicated relationship among key ecological constraints
featured in the ECH (particularly ψ, N, and x¯) indicates that the ECH is better framed in terms
of more basic ecological features (e.g. mortality rates, or even birth rates when appropriate).
Of course, what basic ecological features one accounts for will depend on what species is under
consideration, and constraints beyond those accounted for here (e.g. constraints like spatial or
temporal variability in habitat quality or food availability) will play a role, in general.
The main conclusion my analysis points to is that ecological constraints do not need to
“piggy-back” on other features of a species’ biology (e.g. territory inheritance, or indeed any
other feature that supplies helpers with a direct fitness benefit) in order to exert influence over
the emergence of auxiliary help. This conclusion differs from conclusions made by other the-
oretical treatments of cooperative breeding that have incorporated population dynamics. The
model proposed by Pen and Weissing [23] assumed that helpful and selfish auxiliaries alike
had to pass through the same intermediary stage (a “waiter” or “floater” stage) before breeding
could occur. Individuals were influenced by ecological constraints during the “waiter” stage,
and since “waiting” occurred regardless of the level of help offered by an auxiliary, ecological
constraints acting during that period of the life history necessarily cancelled from the invasion
condition. By contrast, my model did not explicitly consider a “waiter” stage. Instead it as-
sumed that the life history of a helpful auxiliary diverged from that of a selfish auxiliary until
such time as recruitment to the breeder class occurred. As a result, ecological constraints in
my model could affect helpful and selfish auxiliaries differently, and were not fated to cancel
out of the calculations. Since “waiters” or “floaters” are simply dispersers that have not yet se-
cured a breeding territory [33], my model does implicitly deal with these types of individuals.
Indeed, the cost of dispersal c could be interpreted as a mortality rate suffered while “waiting”
or “floating”.
There are many aspects of cooperative breeding not addressed by the work presented here.
I chose to ignore many features of the biology of cooperative breeders (e.g. parenting ex-
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perience, local competitive effects, territory inheritance, issues concerning variable levels of
promiscuity) in order to focus on the ECH. Granted, some assumptions were made in order to
keep the model as simple as possible. In particular, I chose to model cooperative breeders as
hermaphrodites with an evolutionarily fixed pattern of sex allocation. While the consequences
of cooperative breeding for the evolution of sex allocation and the sex ratio are well under-
stood [27, 34, 35], the joint evolution of auxiliary help and sex allocation are not. In my model,
the parent who produces an offspring (auxiliary) through female function receives help. This
suggests that if I was to track the evolution of sex allocation strategies I would find bias toward
investment in female function (or, for a dioecious species, possibly a female-biased sex ratio).
Nevertheless, allowing sex allocation or the sex ratio to evolve should not affect the main con-
clusion that ecological constraints exert a principal – rather than supplementary – influence on
the emergence of cooperative breeding.
One key limitation of my work is that it does not address possible changes in breeder
behaviour with increasing help. In many cooperatively breeding birds, for example, breeders
reduce their workload as helpers take on some of the burden [36–38]. Adaptive changes like
these would certainly detract from the size of the benefit required for auxiliary help to emerge,
but should not affect my main conclusion.
A second key limitation of my work is that it only predicts when auxiliary help will
emerge—it does not predict the ultimate level at which such help will be provisioned. By
focusing on emergence only I was able to ensure population dynamics could be described in
two dimensions which made a powerful set of mathematical results available. Future work will
go beyond the emergence of auxiliary help, and consider the maintenance of help.
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Chapter 3
Evolutionary dynamics of cooperative
breeding
3.1 Summary
Cooperative breeding is a social system in which certain individuals (auxiliaries) postpone or
forgo their own reproduction to help other individuals (breeders). The evolutionary motivation
for this behaviour has been considerably debated, but the debate has focused on models that
neglect long-term evolutionary dynamics. As a result, there is little theoretical understand-
ing of how emergence theory relates to the maintenance of cooperative breeding and optimal
strategies, how optimal strategies relate to ecology, and the scope for breeder-auxiliary conflict,
particularly when costs are paid by auxiliaries (i.e. helping causes higher mortality). In this
chapter, I use an adaptive dynamics approach to explicitly model the long-term evolution of
cooperative breeding when help is under either maternal or auxiliary control. I then use the
Ecological Constraints Hypothesis (ECH), a well-known theory for the emergence of coopera-
tive breeding, to provide context for the predicted trajectory of the optimal strategy. I find that
the predictions made by the ECH for the effect of ecology upon the emergence of helping can
be related to the effect of ecology upon the optimal strategy – provided helpers are ‘making the
best of a bad situation’. When fitness returns from helping are sufficiently large, the motivation
for helping changes, and the ECH does not apply.
3.2 Introduction
Cooperative breeding is a social system in which certain non-breeding individuals (i.e. auxil-
iaries) postpone or forgo their own reproduction to help breeding individuals. In many species,
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auxiliary help increases breeder fecundity [1–5], yet providing help comes at some cost, such
as exposing auxiliaries to greater mortality risks [6–8]. Why an individual would opt to help
another instead of behaving selfishly represents a fundamental question of biology, and as a
result, has been studied extensively [9–12].
While there are many evolutionary explanations for the emergence of cooperative breed-
ing [10, 12–14], and a large body of modelling work [15–18], very little has been done on
the long-term evolution of cooperative breeding, that is, what constitutes an optimal helping
strategy, rather than what conditions promote the emergence of helping. The few models that
have considered optimal strategies [16], did so without explicitly accounting for population
dynamics, an approach that can produce misleading or ecologically unrealistic results [17].
As a consequence, there are many unanswered questions about the evolution of cooperative
breeding. In particular: i) what is the range of ecological conditions and optimal strategies that
can be explained by extending existing emergence theory, ii) what the relationship between
the ecology and the optimal strategy is, and iii) because costs are often asymmetrically paid
by auxiliaries, the scope for breeder-auxiliary conflict [15, 19]. Theoretical understanding of
these questions is prerequisite to the understanding of the evolution of higher level social or-
ganization and transitions to more complicated breeding systems, such as obligate cooperative
breeding.
Clearly, existing theory for the emergence of helping should, under certain conditions, be
able to predict the optimal strategy and the maintenance of cooperative breeding. As such,
existing emergence theory should provide context for the long-term evolutionary dynamics of
cooperative breeding. Arguably the most prominent evolutionary explanation for the emer-
gence of cooperative breeding is the Ecological Constraints Hypothesis, or ECH [9, 10, 15].
The ECH argues that the decision to help is motivated by constraints on independent breeding,
specifically: a high cost of dispersal, a low probability of securing a breeding territory, and
low expected fecundity as an independent breeder [10, 15]. The ECH emphasizes that auxil-
iaries help in order ‘make the best of a bad situation’, and if given a viable opportunity, would
breed independently [20]. While helpers may initially help in order to ‘make the best of a bad
situation’, it is not necessarily true that this will persist with escalating levels of help, or that
the constraints will facilitate higher levels of help in the same way that they are predicted to
promote the emergence. Moreover, there is considerable scope for maternal-auxiliary conflict:
if the auxiliaries bear the brunt of the costs of helping (e.g. increased mortality), then there
should exist a discrepancy between the optimal level of help under auxiliary control versus
maternal control [15, 19, 21]. Despite these drawbacks, the general and intuitive nature of the
constraints of the ECH makes them useful measures to contextualize the evolutionary dynamics
of cooperative breeding.
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The objective of this chapter is to determine the optimal cooperative breeding strategy and
relate it to: i) the scope for breeder-auxiliary conflict, ii) the ecology of the system, and iii)
the ECH. To do so, I consider a population consisting of breeders and auxiliaries, and suppose
that by helping, auxiliaries increase breeder fecundity. I use an explicit population dynamic
model on which I conduct a full evolutionary analysis. I investigate the role played by the
ecology and the ecological constraints of the ECH [10, 15] upon the optimal strategy. I find
that provided helpers are ‘making the best of a bad situation’ [20], the predictions of the ECH
for the emergence of cooperative breeding can explain the trajectory of the optimal strategy.
However, my analysis reveals that there exists a critical value at which helping yields equivalent
fitness returns to breeding: above this value, helpers are no longer simply ‘making the best of a
bad situation’ and the predicted relationship between the ECH and optimal level of help breaks
down.
3.3 Wild-type population
The model population consists of diploid hermaphrodites experiencing continuously overlap-
ping generations. I focus on hermaphrodites to simplify the analysis, but my results will apply
to dioecious species with an evolutionarily fixed pattern of sex allocation. Individuals in the
population are classified as either breeders or auxiliaries, and I denote their densities at time t as
B and A, respectively. Breeders produce male gametes (sperm) and female gametes (oocytes)
through fair meiosis. I assume that breeder production of oocytes occurs at a per-capita rate
α. Each oocyte is fertilized independently by a uniform random breeder in the population.
The assumption that the population is outcrossed is intended to mimic cooperatively breeding
species who avoid inbreeding [22].
While there are many forms of cooperative breeding [23, 24], I assume that cooperation in
my population occurs in a ‘kin neighbourhood’ system [20, 23, 24]. Kin neighbourhoods are
opportunistic, flexible aggregates of individuals in which helpers tend to associate with specific
groups of breeders, rather than with their natal site [24]. Kin neighbourhood systems represent
a substantial proportion of cooperatively breeding birds [23, 24], and in avian species these
loose affiliations are often referred to as ‘clans’ or ‘coteries’ [24–26]. Using a ‘kin neighbour-
hood’ system will reduce the dimensionality of the model and make the mathematics more
tractable.
Because the focus is kin neighbourhood cooperative breeding, I suppose that auxiliaries
are imprinted on the phenotype of their ‘mother’. Since each type of ‘mother’ is comprised of
identical individuals, on average each individual mother can expect the same amount of help
as other mothers of the same type, and so helping is evenly allocated within phenotype. A key
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component of this assumption is that I do not model a class of ‘waiter’ or ‘floater’ auxiliaries
as has been done elsewhere [17, 27]. While certain species do develop ‘waiter’ classes, it is
not essential to the emergence or evolution of cooperative breeding [28]. Help provided by
auxiliaries increases breeder oocyte production at an additive rate h ≥ 0 (h = 0 corresponds to
a selfish population).
Density-dependent fecundity can act as a limitation to population growth in cooperatively
breeding species [1, 3], so I assume that oocytes instantaneously develop into auxiliaries at
a density-dependent per capita rate of κ1
κ1+A
where κ1 is a positive parameter. I suppose the
environment can only support a limited density of breeders, hence auxiliaries recruit to the
breeding class at a per-capita rate of d κ
κ+B , where d and κ are positive parameters. In keeping
with the ECH [10], I allow dispersal to come at a cost, c, therefore successful recruitment
occurs with probability (1 − c). Upon successful recruitment, an individual remains a breeder
for the remainder of their life. Helping is a costly behaviour [8]. To account for this, I let the
per-capita rate of auxiliary mortality be a strictly increasing function of h, that is µ(h), a trade-
off in many cooperatively breeding species [6, 7]. Finally, breeders die at a per-capita rate of
mB. To reduce the number of parameters in the model, I non-dimensionalize by letting τ = α t
and then define new non-dimensionalized parameters as b = h/α, µB = mB/α, and ν = d/α.
Therefore, the monomorphic wild-type population dynamics can be described as
B˙ = −µB B + (1 − c) ν κ
κ + B
A,
A˙ = −µ(b) A + κ1
κ1 + A
(B + b A) − ν κ
κ + B
A,
(3.1)
where dots denote differentiation with respect to τ. We are only interested in non-negative
solutions of (3.1). System (3.1) always admits a trivial equilibrium, (0, 0). Denote the expected
life-time reproductive success (LRS), or basic reproduction number, of an individual at low-
densities as
R0 =
(1 − c) ν
µ(b) + ν
(
b
(1 − c) ν +
1
µB
)
. (3.2)
The basic reproduction number, R0, is the product of i) the probability of successful establish-
ment as a independent breeder at low population densities, ν (1 − c)/(µ(b) + ν), and ii) lifetime
reproductive success through both male and female function, weighted by genetic contribu-
tion, (1/2)(2 b/((1 − c) ν) + 2/µB). From the quantity given by (3.2), I can make the following
statement about the trivial equilibrium:
Theorem 3.3.1 The trivial equilibrium solution to (3.1) is locally asymptotically stable when-
ever R0 < 1, and unstable whenever R0 > 1.
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Proof The Jacobian evaluated at the trivial equilibrium is
J0 =
 −µB (1 − c) ν1 −(µ(b) + ν) + b
 ,
and I assess local asymptotic stability of (0, 0) by using the Routh-Hurwitz criteria. For stabil-
ity, we require that Tr J0 = − (µB + µ(b) + ν) + b < 0, and det J0 = µ(b) + ν − b − (1−c) νµB > 0. It
is clear that the limiting condition is det J0 > 0. This can be rearranged such that if R0 < 1 then
the equilibrium is stable. Therefore, the trivial equilibrium is stable when R0 < 1, and unstable
whenever R0 > 1.
Now, note that there are no possible solutions to (3.1) where either B¯ = 0 or A¯ = 0 and A¯ , 0
or B¯ , 0. Therefore, suppose that B¯ , 0 and A¯ , 0, then A¯ = µB(1−c) ν κ B¯
(
κ + B¯
)
, and B¯ is the
roots of the cubic polynomial
µ(b)
κ (µ(b) + ν)
B¯3 +
(
1 +
µ(b)
µ(b) + ν
)
B¯2 +
(
κ − (1 − c) ν κ1
µ(b) + ν
b − µ(b)
µB
)
B¯ − κ1 κν (1 − c)
µB
(R0 − 1) .
Theorem 3.3.2 When R0 > 1, there is a unique, positive non-trivial equilibrium, (B¯, A¯).
Proof Suppose we rewrote the cubic polynomial (3.3) as a0 B¯3 + a1 B¯2 + a2 B¯ + a3. Then if
R0 > 1, a3 < 1. Since a0 and a1 are strictly positive, irrespective of whether or not a2 is positive
or negative, if R0 > 1 there is only one sign change amongst the ordered coefficients of the
polynomial (3.3). Therefore, by Descartes’ rule of signs, if R0 > 1, there is a unique, positive
root of (3.3), and hence only one positive non-trivial equilibrium of (3.1).
I now establish that (3.1) is a biologically well-behaved model.
Theorem 3.3.3 The system given by (3.1) is positive and bounded.
Proof For positivity, I calculate the dot-product of system (3.1) with vectors that are inward
normal to the axes of the positive quadrant〈
B˙, A˙
〉
B=0
A>0
· 〈1, 0〉T = (1 − c) ν A > 0, (3.3)〈
B˙, A˙
〉
B>0
A=0
· 〈0, 1〉T = B > 0. (3.4)
It follows immediately that positivity is satisfied. To prove boundedness, I do so by contra-
diction. Suppose B(τ) becomes unbounded. Then when τ → ∞, B˙ > 0, and so µBB <
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(1 − c)νκ/(κ + B)A. If true, I can construct an upperbound for A˙, A˙u, as
A˙ = −µ(b) A + κ1
κ1 + A
(B + b A) − (1 − c) ν κ
κ + B
A, (3.5)
< −µ(b) A + κ1
κ1 + A
(B + b A) − µB B, (3.6)
< −µ(b) A + B + b κ1 − µB B = A˙u. (3.7)
Solving A˙u, I obtain
Au(τ) =
∫ [
B(τ) + b κ1 − µB B(τ)] eµ(b) τdτ + A0
eµ(b) τ
. (3.8)
Since µ(b) > 0, limτ→∞ eµ(b) τ = ∞. Therefore, if the numerator of (3.8) remains finite, then
limτ→∞ Au(τ) → 0 which implies that B(τ) is bounded, a contradiction. Suppose instead that
the numerator of (3.8) becomes unbounded. Then by l’Hospital’s rule
lim
τ→∞ A
u(τ) =
B(τ) + b − µBB(τ)
µ(b)
(3.9)
So Au(τ) < B(τ)+b
µ(b) . Using this upperbound of A
u in B˙:
B˙ = −µB B(τ) + (1 − c) ν κ
κ + B(τ)
B(τ) + b
µ(b)
, (3.10)
< −µB B(τ) + ν κ
µ(b)
+
b ν
µ(b)
, (3.11)
with solution
B(τ) ≤ 1
µB
(
ν κ
µ(b)
+
b ν
µ(b)
)
+ e−µB τB0 (3.12)
which is finite. So B(τ) cannot become unbounded. Suppose B(τ) is bounded and A(τ) becomes
unbounded. This implies that as A becomes large
A˙ = −µ(b) A + κ1
κ1 + A
(B + b A) − ν κ
κ + B
A (3.13)
< −µ(b) A + b = A˙u (3.14)
and this has solution Au(τ) = b
µ(b) + A0e
−µ(b)τ which is bounded, so I again arrive at a contradic-
tion. Therefore the system is bounded.
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Now, define the following open rectangle,
Ω(M) = {(A, B) ∈ R2| 0 < B < M, 0 < A < M}, (3.15)
where M > 0 is arbitrary. It is apparent that Ω(M) is an open, simply connected region of R2.
Then by Theorem 3.3.3, all solutions of (3.1) in Ω(M) are positive and bounded, which is also
the proof to the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3.4 The rectangle Ω(M) is forward invariant under solutions to (3.1).
Remark My proof to Theorem 3.3.4 also shows solutions to (3.1) with intial conditions in the
closure of Ω(M), clΩ(M), remain trapped in this compact subset of R2 for all dimensionless
time τ > 0. This ensures the ω-limit sets of the solutions are non-empty [29].
Theorem 3.3.5 The rectangle Ω(M) does not contain any periodic solutions to (3.1).
Proof To demonstrate the absence of periodic solutions in Ω(M), I will use Dulac’s criteria
[29]. Define g(B, A) = 1A B . Then calculating the divergence of < g · B˙, g · A˙ >, I obtain
div
(
g · B˙, g · A˙
)
= div
(
−µB
A
+
(1 − c) ν κ
(κ + B) B
,−µ(b)
B
+
1
A
κ1
κ1 + A
− ν κ
(κ + B) B
)
= −
(
(1 − c) ν κ (κ + 2 B)
((κ + B) B)2
+
1
A2
κ1
(κ1 + A)2
(κ1 + 2A)
)
< 0. (3.16)
As Ω(M) is an open, simply connected subset of R2 and the right-hand side of (3.1) is contin-
uously differentiable, because (3.16) does not change signs in Ω(M), by Dulac’s criteria there
are no periodic orbits in Ω(M) [29].
I now can address the limiting behaviour of solutions with initial conditions in Ω(M).
Theorem 3.3.6 If R0 > 1, trajectories of solutions with non-negative initial conditions tend to
the unique non-trivial equilibrium, B¯, A¯ within Ω(M).
Proof I have demonstrated that the trajectories are bounded for arbitrarily large M, that there
are no periodic solutions in Ω(M), and that when R0 > 1 the trivial equilibrium is unstable.
Moreover, provided R0 > 1, there exists a unique, non-trivial equilibrium in Ω(M). Therefore,
by Poincare´-Bendixson Theorem [29] as τ → ∞ the trajectories must converge to this non-
trivial equilibrium in the interior of Ω(M).
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Let φ = ν κ
κ+B¯ . Then when the population is at equilibrium, an individual expects to recruit
to the breeding class with probability ψ = (1−c) φ
µ(b)+φ , while its expected reproductive success as a
breeder is the sum of its unassisted and assisted reproduction, N = NA+NU , where NU = κ1κ1+A¯
2
µB
and NA = κ1κ1+A¯
2 b
µB
A¯
B¯ . In the monomorphic, wild-type population, NA and NU are comprised of
equal parts male and female reproductive function. It follows that the expected LRS of a wild-
type individual at equilibrium, weighted by genetic contribution to offspring, is 12 ψN = 1.
3.4 Evolutionary dynamics
I now look for the optimal helping strategy, which I will denote b∗. Because the mutant allele
is initially rare, the success of a mutant invasion is determined entirely by heterozygous indi-
viduals. Moreover, while rare, the dynamics of the mutant subpopulation are approximately
linear. Let Ai j denote the density of auxiliaries with i copies of the mutant allele produced by
the female function of a breeder with j copies of the same allele (i.e. i helping j), and let B1
denote the density of heterozygous breeders.
Suppose a mutant enters the wild-type population which is at the wild-type ecological equi-
librium. Assume the mutation is initially rare, is not recessive, and occurs at a single, diallelic
autosomal locus. I do not consider behaviour mutations: if the mutant is an auxiliary and is
the only mutant in the population, it must be helping a wild-type breeder, because both of its
parents must be wild-type (i.e. the mutant must have originated from a spontaneous germline
mutation). Denote the wild-type strategy as b0 = h/α ≥ 0, and let the strategy employed by
heterozygous individuals be b1 , b0.
In general, models of cooperative breeding have assumed that the level of help is under
auxiliary control [17, 18] (but see [15]); however it is likely that breeders have at least some
say in the amount of help that auxiliaries provide [15]. While forcible retention of helpers by
breeders is unlikely [15], breeders could exert control through, for example, maternal hormones
[19, 30]. In what follows, I consider the cases of auxiliary and maternal control of helping.
Under auxiliary control, the rate at which an auxiliary helps is determined by its genotype,
whereas under maternal control, the rate at which the auxiliary helps is determined by the
genotype of the breeder which it imprints upon.
For the moment, suppose helping is under auxiliary control. Then the invasion dynamics
of the mutant can be described using the non-dimensionalized linearized system of differential
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equations
B˙1 = −µB B1 + (1 − c) ν κ
κ + B¯
(A10 + A11) ,
A˙01 = −µ(b0) A01 − ν κ
κ + B¯
A01 +
1
2
κ1
κ1 + A¯
(B1 + b0 A01 + b1 A11) ,
A˙11 = −µ(b1) A11 − ν κ
κ + B¯
A11 +
1
2
κ1
κ1 + A¯
(B1 + b0 A01 + b1 A11) ,
A˙10 = −µ(b1) A10 − ν κ
κ + B¯
A10 +
1
2
κ1
κ1 + A¯
(
1 + b0
A¯
B¯
)
B1.
(3.17)
Because the mutant is rare, I am interested in the stability of the mutant-free equilibrium
(MFE). As before, the MFE entails the wild-type population being at or near the non-trivial
equilibrium, A¯ and B¯, while A01 = A10 = A11 = B1 = 0. The Jacobian evaluated at the MFE is:
JMFE =

−µ(b0) − φ + 12b0ϑ 12b1ϑ 0 12ϑ
1
2b0ϑ −µ(b1) + 12b1ϑ − φ 0 12ϑ
0 0 −µ(b1) − φ 12ϑ + 12b0ϑ A¯B¯
0 (1 − c) φ (1 − c) φ −µB

where I have let ϑ = κ1
κ1+A¯
. To determine stability, I will use Next Generation Theorem [31, 32].
Briefly, this approach involves decomposing matrix J into matrices F and V where F represents
the inputs to the system while V represents movement between classes and mortality, such that
J = F − V . Then the MFE is stable if the spectral radius of the matrix, ρ(FV−1), is less than 1.
Following this logic, FV−1 is equal to
1
2
b0
φ+µ(b0)
ϑ 12
b1
φ+µ(b1)
ϑ + 12
1
µB
ϑψm
1
2
1
µB
ϑψm
1
2
1
µB
ϑ
1
2
b0
φ+µ(b0)
ϑ 12
b1
φ+µ(b1)
ϑ + 12
1
µB
ϑψm
1
2
1
µB
ϑψm
1
2
1
µB
ϑ
0 12
(
1
µB
+ b0
µB
A¯
B¯
)
ϑψm
1
2
(
1
µB
+ b0
µB
A¯
B¯
)
ϑψm
1
2
(
1
µB
+ b0
µB
A¯
B¯
)
ϑ
0 0 0 0
 (3.18)
where ψM =
(1−c) φ
µ(b1)+φ
. The matrix (3.18) is block triangular, and the magnitude of one of its
eigenvalues is clearly less than one. Therefore, I am only concerned with the eigenvalues of
the highlighted 3 × 3 block. The characteristic polynomial of this block is λ
(
λ2 + A1λ + A2
)
where
−A1 = (1 − c) φ
µ(b1) + φ
ϑ
(
1
µB
+
1
2
b0
µB
A¯
B¯
)
+ ϑ
1
2
b1
µ(b1) + φ
+ ϑ
1
2
b0
µ(b0) + φ
, (3.19)
A2 =
1
2
(1 − c) φ
µ(b1) + φ
ϑ
(
1
µB
+
b0
µB
A¯
B¯
)
ϑ
(
1
2
b1
µ(b1) + φ
+
1
2
b0
µ(b0) + φ
)
. (3.20)
From the form of the characteristic polynomial, it is clear that one eigenvalue is 0, and hence I
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need only assess the magnitude of the roots of λ2 + A1λ + A2. If M is a 2 × 2 matrix then the
preceding expression is its characteristic polynomial; moreover −A1 = Tr M and A2 = det M.
Theorem 3.4.1 All eigenvalues of M are less than one in absolute value if and only if |Tr M| <
det M + 1.
Proof To prove this, I use the Jury Conditions. These state that the necessary and sufficient
conditions for the absolute value of all eigenvalues of a 2 × 2 matrix to be less than one is
that det M < 1 and |Tr M| < det M + 1. Let P0 = 12ϑ b0µ(b0)+φ , P1 = 12ϑ b1µ(b1)+φ . When b1 > b0,
det M < 1 can be rearranged to give
(P0 + P1)
1
4 (1 − c) φ
µ(b1) + φ
N < 1. (3.21)
Likewise, |Tr M| < det M + 1 can be rearranged to give
ϑ
(1 − c) φ
µ(b1) + φ
(
1
µB
+
1
2
b0
µB
A¯
B¯
)
+ P0 + P1 < [P0 + P1]
1
4 (1 − c) φ
µ(b1) + φ
N + 1,
⇔ (P0 + P1)
1 − 14 (1 − c) φ
µ(b1) + φ
N
 + ϑ (1 − c) φ
µ(b1) + φ
(
1
µB
+
1
2
b0
µB
A¯
B¯
)
< 1. (3.22)
Based upon how I have arranged (3.21) and (3.22), it is clear that if the left-hand side of (3.22)
is always larger than the left-hand side of (3.21), then |Tr M| < det M + 1 must be the limiting
condition. It follows that for |Tr M| < det M + 1 to be the condition, it is sufficient that
1 −
1
4 (1 − c) φ
µ(b1) + φ
N >
1
4 (1 − c) φ
µ(b1) + φ
N,
⇔ 1 = 1
2
(1 − c) φ
µ(b0) + φ
N >
1
2
(1 − c) φ
µ(b1) + φ
N,
which is true because µ(b1) > µ(b0). Now consider the case when b1 < b0. If b1 < b0, then
(1−c) φ
µ(b1)+φ
ϑ 1
µB
> (1−c) φ
µ(b0)+φ
ϑ 1
µB
so P1 < P0 otherwise there is no evolutionary trade-off. Then it follows
that P0 + P1 < 2P0 < 1, and det M < 1 can be rearranged to give
1
4 (1 − c) φ
µ(b1) + φ
N <
1
P0 + P1
. (3.23)
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Likewise, |Tr M| < det M + 1 can be rearranged such that
1
4 (1 − c) φ
µ(b1) + φ
N +
1
2
ϑ
(1 − c) φ
µ(b1) + φ
1
µB
+ P1 + P0 <
1
4 (1 − c) φ
µ(b1) + φ
N (P0 + P1) + 1,
⇔
1
4 (1 − c) φ
µ(b1) + φ
N [1 − P0 − P1] < 1 − P0 − P1 − 12ϑ
(1 − c) φ
µ(b1) + φ
1
µB
,
⇔
1
4 (1 − c) φ
µ(b1) + φ
N < 1 −
1
2ϑ
(1−c) φ
µ(b1)+φ
1
µB
1 − P0 − P1 . (3.24)
Notice that the left-hand side of (3.23) and the left-hand side of (3.24) are identical, yet the
right-hand side of (3.24) is always smaller than the right-hand side of (3.23), therefore |Tr M| <
det M + 1 is the limiting condition. It follows that the invasion function under auxiliary control
is |Tr M| < det M + 1.
By rearranging |Tr M| < det M + 1, the mutant can invade provided
λ(b1, b0) = ψM
(
2
µB
+
b0
µB
A¯
B¯
)
+
(
b1
µ(b1) + φ
+
b0
µ(b0) + φ
) (
1 − 1
4
ψMN
)
> ψ
2
µB
. (3.25)
If b0 = 0, (3.25) reduces to the condition for a helpful mutant to invade a selfish population
when helping is under auxiliary control. Let b0 = 0, and assume weak selection. Then per-
forming a Taylor expansion of (3.25), and ignoring terms higher than first order, the condition
for invasion can be simplified to
− 1
µ(0) + φ
dµ(b1)
db1
∣∣∣∣∣
b1=0
+
1
4
κ1
κ1 + A¯
1
µ(0) + φ
> 0. (3.26)
I note the similarities between (3.26) and the condition obtained in the previous chapter (also
see [18]). The most important difference between the two is that time spent as a productive
helper, in this model 1
µ(0)+φ , is no longer dependent upon breeder mortality, which in turn in-
creases the benefits of helping. In [18] and the previous chapter, helpers were associated with
a site rather than a breeder phenotype. When helpers are associated with a particular site, then
death of the breeder ends the period for which the auxiliary can be a productive helper. On
the other hand, if the auxiliary is associated with a breeder phenotype rather than a site, in the
event of a breeder death the auxiliary can shift its help to another breeder in the group. This
difference functions to promote the emergence of cooperative breeding, as expected [24].
Now, suppose that auxiliary help is under maternal control. To obtain the condition for
invasion under maternal control, notice that in (3.17), whenever bi or µ(bi) is present, it is
multiplied by Ai j. If I swap each instance of bi or µ(bi) with i = j, I obtain the linearized
dynamics of a mutant population when the helping strategy is dictated by maternal phenotype.
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This slightly modifies the matrix FV−1, (3.18), used for auxiliary control, specifically:
1
2
b1
φ+µ(b1)
ϑ 12
b1
φ+µ(b1)
ϑ + 12
1
µB
ϑψM
1
2
1
µB
ϑψ 12
1
µB
ϑ
1
2
b1
φ+µ(b1)
ϑ 12
b1
φ+µ(b1)
ϑ + 12
1
µB
ϑψM
1
2
1
µB
ϑψ 12
1
µB
ϑ
0 12
(
1
µB
+ b0
µB
A¯
B¯
)
ϑψM
1
2
(
1
µB
+ b0
µB
A¯
B¯
)
ϑψ 12
(
1
µB
+ b0
µB
A¯
B¯
)
ϑ
0 0 0 0
 . (3.27)
The matrix (3.27) is block triangular, and the characteristic polynomial of the highlighted
block is λ
(
λ2 + A1λ + A2
)
, where
Tr M = −A1 = 12 +
1
2
ϑ
(1 − c) φ
µ(b1) + φ
(
1
µB
+
b1
µB
A¯
B¯
)
+
b1
µ(b1) + φ
ϑ, (3.28)
det M = A2 =
1
2
ϑ
b1
µ(b1) + φ
. (3.29)
Using the Jury Conditions to determine stability, it is apparent by inspection that |Tr M| <
det M + 1 is the limiting condition. It follows that the invasion condition can be written as
λ(b1, b0) =
(1 − c) φ
µ(b1) + φ
κ1
κ1 + A¯
(
1
µB
+
b1
µB
A¯
B¯
)
> 1. (3.30)
Like (3.25), if b0 = 0, (3.30) reduces to the condition for a helpful mutant to invade a selfish
population when helping is under maternal control. Moreover, (3.30) has a simple biological
interpretation: if the expected LRS of a rare mutant in a wild-type population at equilibrium is
greater than that of its average wild-type counterpart (that is, 12ψN = 1 or right-hand side of
(3.30)), the mutant will avoid extinction and invade.
3.4.1 Optimal strategy
I now look for the optimal helping strategy, or singular strategy [33], b∗. This can be obtained
by differentiating either (3.25) or (3.30) with respect to b1, then setting b1 = b0 = b∗. Following
some trivial reductions using the relation 12ψN = 1, the optimal strategy can be implicitly
written as
−1
2
∂
∂b1
[
(1 − c) φ
µ(b1) + φ
κ1
κ1 + A¯
ζ
µB
]
b1=b0=b∗
= R2 ∂
∂b1
[
κ1
κ1 + A¯
b1
µ(b1) + φ
]
b1=b0=b∗
, (3.31)
where under auxiliary control, R2 = 14 and ζ = 2, while under maternal control, R2 = 12 , and
ζ = 1. From (3.31), it is clear that there exists scope for breeder-auxiliary conflict over the
allocation of help. In particular, under maternal control, the costs of helping are always less
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because the mutant breeder pays a smaller price as it is enlisting the helpers as opposed to being
one of the helpers. As a result, breeders always want more help than the amount that auxiliaries
are comfortable providing. This is intuitive: auxiliaries in my model pay the costs, and so while
a breeder treats auxiliaries equally, the auxiliary favours itself over its siblings [21, 39].
Of course, (3.31) represents a point at which the local fitness gradient is zero, and does not
necessarily correspond to a fitness maximum [33]. To determine whether (3.31) is, for example,
a terminal point of evolution or a branching point, one must consider higher order effects. In
Appendix B, I derive the conditions for the optimal strategies of (3.31) to be an evolutionarily
stable strategy (ESS) [33, 35] and a convergence stable strategy [36]. Because these quantities
are not easily amenable to biological interpretation, I do not analyze them further. However,
one of the necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for (3.31) to be an ESS is that µ(b) must be
a strictly accelerating function of b, so in what follows I assume this is true (recall that µ(b) is
also strictly increasing with b in order for there to exist a trade-off).
3.5 Ecology and ecological constraints
I now consider the interaction between the optimal strategies and the ecology of the system,
which I relate to the constraints of the ECH, specifically: the cost of dispersal, c, and the proba-
bility of successfully recruiting to the breeder class, ψ [10]. The other key ecological constraint
is expected fecundity as an independent breeder [10]. In an established cooperatively breeding
population, an individual can expect to generate indirect fitness benefits as an auxiliary, ben-
efits which on average are equivalent to expected assisted fecundity as a breeder. Critically,
to realize these benefits, an auxiliary does not need to become a breeder. Hence, if helping
returns escalate, this can provide incentive to remain an auxiliary. Therefore, rather than using
the original ecological constraint of the ECH, expected fecundity as an independent breeder,
2
µB
κ1
κ1+A¯
, I instead use the difference between unassisted and assisted fecundity (i.e. NU − NA).
Denoting this value as Nˆ, or the relative expected fecundity an individual receives as an in-
dependent breeder, in my model this is: Nˆ = κ1
κ1+A¯
(
2
µB
− 2 b
µB
A¯
B¯
)
. Notice that if the focus is on
emergence, then b = 0, and the constraint is identical to the one originally formulated in the
ECH.
3.5.1 Cost of dispersal
The ECH predicts that the emergence of cooperative breeding is promoted when the cost of
dispersal is increased. Since increasing the cost of dispersal reduces the likelihood of estab-
lishment as a breeder, it is expected that it should have a similar effect on the promotion of
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Figure 3.1: Effect of the cost of dispersal, c, on the predicted optimal strategy, b∗. Dashed
lines correspond to the scenario when helping is under maternal control, while solid lines
correspond to when the helping is under auxiliary control. Each line represents a different
value of breeder mortality, µB, from µB = 0.2 to µB = 0.7 in evenly spaced increments.
Larger values of µB yielded larger predicted values of b∗. In this figure κ = κ1 = 1.0,
ν = 2.5, and µ(b) = 0.1 + 0.1 b + 0.02 b2, but the same qualitative relationships were
observed at all parameter combinations and functional forms of µ(b) investigated, provided
µ(b) was strictly increasing and accelerating with b.
higher levels of help; in fact, in my model cost of dispersal is predicted to uniformly increase
the optimal helping strategy under both breeder and auxiliary control (Fig. 3.1). Indeed, this
result agrees with my results from the previous chapter (see also [18]).
3.5.2 Density-dependent effects
In my model, I have two density-dependent effects: density-dependent recruitment to the
breeder class and density-dependent fecundity. The parameters controlling the magnitude of
these two density-dependent interactions are κ and κ1, respectively. When κ (resp. κ1) is small,
breeder recruitment (resp. fecundity) is strongly affected by the density of breeders (resp. aux-
iliaries), whereas when κ (resp. κ1) is large, breeder recruitment (resp. fecundity) is weakly
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affected by density of breeders (resp. auxiliaries).
To understand the effect of varying κ and κ1 upon (3.31), note that
R2 b
∗
µ(b∗)
=
1
2
ζ (1 − c)
µB
, (3.32)
is a particular solution to (3.31). To demonstrate this, simply substitute into (3.31) and reduce
– explicit values of A¯ and B¯ are not needed for this particular case. The particular solution
given by (3.32) admits a biological interpretation. Suppose we wanted to determine which
life-history stage yields greater fitness returns, that is, who would an individual rather be, an
auxiliary or breeder? To answer this question, we need to consider the fitness of a breeder
independently of an auxiliary, and vice-versa. Doing so requires ignoring any assisted fecun-
dity a breeder can expect and any movement between classes. Then, the left-hand side (LHS)
of (3.32) represents the expected indirect fitness gains from helping, while the right-hand side
(RHS) is the expected direct fitness gains as an unassisted breeder reduced by cost of disper-
sal. In both cases, these values are weighted by genetic relatedness to the new individuals
produced, measured as a statistical probability. Therefore, when the LHS of (3.32) is greater
than the RHS, an individual generates more indirect fitness returns as an auxiliary then direct
fitness returns as a breeder; whereas if the converse is true, an individual generates more direct
fitness returns as a breeder.
Of course, it is important to note that as solutions deviate from (3.32), different aspects of
the ecology come into play (i.e. κ, κ1, and equilibrium population values). I have simplified
the interpretation by focusing on the comparision between R2 b∗µ(b∗) and 12 ζ (1−c)µB . This is why, for
example, if the idealized direct benefits I have given here (i.e. 12
ζ (1−c)
µB
) exceed the idealized
indirect benefits (i.e. R2 b∗µ(b∗) ) the actual results are not as simple as the optimal level of help-
ing should be b∗ = 0. The dilemma for the individual away from (3.32) should be viewed as
something akin to a constrained optimization problem – individuals are attempting to maxi-
mize (3.32) subject to a number of constraints, which are not known in the absence of explicit
solutions to A¯ and B¯.
Returning to density-dependent effects, when (3.32) is satisfied, b∗ is independent of both
κ and κ1. However, if this equality is violated, qualitatively different behaviours of b∗ with
respect to varying κ and κ1 are generated depending upon what side of (3.32) (i.e. whether
LHS is larger than RHS or vice-versa) we are on. In the event κ1 becomes large, that is,
fecundity is only weakly constrained by the density of auxiliaries, (3.1) reduces to
B˙ ≈ µB B + (1 − c) ν κ
κ + B
A,
A˙ ≈ µ(b) A + B + b A − ν κ
κ + B
A.
(3.33)
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System (3.33) can be solved for explicit equilibrium solutions, in particular, the non-trivial
equilibrium, A¯ and B¯, is:
B¯ ≈ κµ(b) + ν
µ(b) − b (R0 − 1) ,
A¯ ≈ µB
(1 − c) κ ν B¯
(
κ + B¯
)
.
(3.34)
Substituting these into (3.31) and solving the differential equation shows that as κ1 becomes
large, the solutions converge to (3.32) (Fig. 3.2). On the other hand, if κ becomes large, that
is, breeder recruitment is only weakly constrained by the density of breeders, the approximate
solutions to A¯ and B¯, obtained similarly to (3.35) are:
B¯ ≈ ν (1 − c) κ1
µB
(R0 − 1) ,
A¯ ≈ µB
(1 − c) ν B¯.
(3.35)
and when these are substituted into (3.31), the solution of the differential equation is
µ(b∗) =
(
ζ (1 − c) ν
µB
+
R2
R1 b
∗
)
µ0 − ν (3.36)
where µ0 is the death rate of selfish auxiliaries. If µ0 =
µB
ζ (1−c) , then the solution is simply (3.32).
Therefore, as κ increases, solutions converge to the curves specified by this equation (Fig. 3.2).
Of course, the behaviour of the differential equation given by (3.31) when κ and κ1 are not
large and we are away from the solution given by (3.32) differs, but for all functional forms of
µ(b) that were strictly increasing and accelerating, I found qualitatively similar results to those
plotted in Figure 3.2.
To understand the biological interpretation of these results, observe that for a fixed value of
breeder mortality, µB, cost of dispersal, c, and functional form of µ(b), the relationship given
by (3.32) is driven by b∗: it is this value that the individual manipulates to maximize the more
valuable fitness return (i.e. LHS or RHS of (3.32)). Suppose indirect fitness benefits gained as a
helper surpass the direct fitness benefits gained as a breeder (LHS greater than RHS of (3.32)).
Then the focus of the individual is upon increasing the level of help, b∗, in order to maximize
the LHS of (3.32) (that is, R2 b∗µ(b∗) ). When the effect of density-dependence upon fecundity
increases (κ1 decreases), less individuals are produced per unit of help, so it is necessary to
increase the level of help to compensate. Similarly, when recruitment becomes increasingly
independent of breeder density, or κ increases, individuals recruit to the breeder class at a
higher rate, meaning less time is spent as an auxiliary, and individuals are thus motivated to
increase the level of help, despite the associated greater risks. Now, suppose that the RHS of
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Figure 3.2: Effect of density-dependent breeder recruitment, κ, density-dependent fecun-
dity, κ1, probability of recruitment, ψ, and relative fecundity, Nˆ, on the predicted optimal
strategy, b∗. Dashed curves correspond to the optimal strategy under maternal control, solid
curves to the optimal strategy under auxiliary control. Heavy-set dashed straight line rep-
resents the critical solution, (3.32), at which the behaviour of system changes changes. For
all values above this line, R2 b∗µ(b∗) > 12 ζ (1−c)µB , while below, the inequality is reversed. Both
solutions above the line use µB = 0.95, while below µB = 0.2. The remaining parameter
values for κ and κ1 plots were κ = 1 or κ1 = 1 depending on which was fixed, ν = 1.5,
and c = 0.1, and µ(b) = 0.18 + 0.06 b + 0.05 b2. The same qualitative relationships were
observed at all parameter combinations and functional forms of µ(b) investigated, provided
µ(b) was strictly increasing and accelerating with b.
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(3.32) is greater. Then the focus of an individual is on decreasing the level of help provided to
reduce its mortality risk as an auxiliary. If fecundity is strongly constrained by density (κ1 is
small), then an individual wants to decrease the level of help provided so as not to pay the same
cost on a depreciating return. If recruitment is weakly effected by breeder density (κ large), the
constraints on becoming a breeder are reduced, and an individual is motivated to decrease the
amount of help it provides to reduce the chance of dying before becoming a breeder.
Importantly, the qualitative behaviour around R2 b∗µ(b∗) = 12 ζ (1−c)µB directly impacts the effect of
two of the ecological constraints upon the optimal strategy, specifically: probability of securing
an independent breeding opportunity, ψ, and the difference between unassisted and assisted
fecundity, Nˆ. The ECH predicts that increasing expected fecundity as an independent breeder,
Nˆ, and increasing probability of recruitment, ψ, should hinder the emergence of helping [10].
I found that when the expected indirect fitness gains as an auxiliary are less than the expected
direct fitness gains as a breeder (LHS < RHS of (3.32)), that is, helpers are making the best
of a bad situation [20], the constraints act to decrease the optimal level of helping (Fig. 3.2),
as predicted by the ECH. However, when the situation is reversed, and indirect fitness gains as
an auxiliary exceed the direct fitness gains as a breeder (LHS > RHS of (3.32)), an individual
has sufficient incentive as an auxiliary that they are no longer simply making the best of a bad
situation. That is, cooperative breeding is no longer an evolutionary puzzle, and individuals
are motivated to help out of their own self interest. When this occurs, the constraints ψ and Nˆ
have the opposite effect on optimal level of help (Fig. 3.2), that is, an increasing probability
of recruitment means that auxiliaries will opt to help at higher levels, despite the associated
increase in mortality, because increasing ψ means less time spent as an auxiliary. Similarly,
increasing expected relative fecundity, Nˆ, compels auxiliaries to help at higher levels, because
the cost of doing so is minimized.
Breeder mortality
Finally, my results illustrate that under both maternal and auxiliary control, increasing breeder
mortality µB promoted higher levels of helping (see Fig. 3.1 and Fig. 3.2). While high breeder
mortality, µB, does result in high population turn-over, the benefits of becoming a breeder are
tempered by the corresponding reduction in life-time fecundity as a breeder. Hence, it is often
more prudent for the auxiliary to invest in helping, despite the costs, a result that has been
predicted elsewhere [10]. This result emphasizes an important point: considering auxiliary and
breeder mortality as independent processes facilitates direct analysis of their individual effects
rather than focusing on an all encompassing quality such as ‘long-lived’ without partitioning
life span into stage structured components. This is particularly true when the risks associated
with helping (e.g. higher mortality) are confined to a single stage (e.g. helping as an auxiliary
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does not effect the mortality risk as a breeder).
Of course, the magnitude of the breeder mortality parameter resulted in qualitatively differ-
ent relationships between the constraints, ψ and Nˆ, and the optimal strategy b∗, depending upon
what side of (3.32) we are on (Fig. 3.2). That breeder mortality can have such a qualitatively
divergent effect upon the optimal strategy, depending upon the ecology, was also observed in
the previous chapter when the focus was on evolutionary emergence of cooperative breeding
(see [18]).
3.6 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, I modelled the evolutionary dynamics of cooperative breeding by using an
explicit model of population dynamics. I supposed that auxiliaries provided help at a level b ≥
0, which had an additive effect upon increasing breeder fecundity, but doing so increased the
helpers mortality, µ(b), which I assumed was a strictly increasing (and accelerating) function
of b. I considered both auxiliary and maternal control over the helping strategy auxiliaries
employed, and was able to obtain the optimal strategy, b∗. My analysis revealed that breeders
always want auxiliaries to help at higher levels than that which they would prefer.
While throughout this chapter I assumed that either auxiliaries or breeders had perfect con-
trol over what strategy was employed, in reality it is likely far more complex. My decision
to focus on the extremes was for illustrative purposes of the scope for conflict. My maternal-
auxiliary conflict arose from a purposefully simplified mechanism to ensure analytic tractabil-
ity of my model, but other, more complex, maternal-auxiliary conflicts are likely to exist. For
example, if the production of oocytes comes at a cost to the breeder in the form of higher
mortality, than a breeder may be inclined to suppress helping in some instances. On the other
hand, if auxiliary help functioned to improve offspring survival, rather than boosting fecundity,
load-lightening could come into play [40], but this would require a different model.
I related the results of my model for the optimal strategy to the constraints of the ECH
argued to promote cooperative breeding [9, 10, 15]. I found that the cost of dispersal, c, per-
formed as predicted by the original ECH [10]. That is, the higher the cost of dispersal, the
higher the optimal level of help, b∗. The other two primary constraints, specifically, probability
of recruiting to the breeder class, ψ, and what I called expected relative fecundity as an inde-
pendent breeder, Nˆ, had a more complicated relationship. I found that the predictions of the
ECH about the effect of the constraints ψ and Nˆ upon the promotion of the emergence of help-
ing can be extended to predict the optimal strategy – provided helpers are ‘making the best of a
bad situation’ [20]. However, my results showed that if the indirect fitness gains of an auxiliary
exceed the direct fitness gains of an unassisted breeder, the motivation for helping changes,
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and helpers are no longer trying to make the best of a bad situation. Instead, auxiliaries are
motivated to escalate the level of help, despite the increased mortality risks, as the objective
is no longer becoming a breeder. As a result, the constraints of the ECH have the converse
effect: increasing the probability of recruitment, ψ and expected relative fecundity, Nˆ, served
to increase the optimal level of help.
By assuming auxiliaries were imprinted upon a phenotype rather than associated with a
specific site, I created conditions that enhanced the evolution of cooperation [24]. The critical
difference is that when auxiliaries associate with a specific site, the amount of time spent as
a productive helper is dependent upon breeder mortality [18]. When the association is with a
phenotype, if the breeder dies, the helper can simply switch to helping another breeder in the
group. However, I would argue that the same qualitative results should be expected irrespective
of whether or not the association is with a site or a phenotype.
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Chapter 4
Summary and future work
4.1 Summary of thesis
Cooperative breeding is a social behaviour in which certain individuals (i.e. auxiliaries) post-
pone or forgo reproduction to help breeding individuals. Because the act of helping comes at
some cost [1], why an individual would opt to cooperate rather than behave selfishly is almost
paradoxical when viewed from the perspective of the theory of natural selection, and as a result
has been studied extensively.
While there are a number of evolutionary explanations for the emergence of cooperative
breeding [2–5], one of the most prominent is the Ecological Constraints Hypothesis (ECH)
[2, 3, 6]. The ECH proposes that helping is motivated by ecological limitations, or ecological
constraints, upon independent breeding. These constraints are: a high cost of dispersal, a low
probability of recruitment to the breeder class, and low expected fecundity as an independent
breeder [2]. While the ECH has empirical support [7, 8], theoretical support is lacking, as the
models that have agreed with it failed to properly account for population dynamics [6, 9, 10].
The one model which did explicitly account for population dynamics by Pen and Weissing [11],
found that provided confounding factors such as territory inheritance were removed, the ECH
was insufficient to predict the emergence of cooperative breeding.
In Chapter 2, I revisited the effect of ecological constraints upon the emergence of coop-
erative breeding. By using an explicit population model, I was able to show that ecological
constraints alone are sufficient to drive the emergence of cooperative breeding, contrary to re-
sults found elsewhere [11]. The reason my results contradicted those of Pen and Weissing [11]
is because their model equally exposed individuals to the ecological constraint, irrespective of
whether or not they chose to help, something which my model did not do. To make my results
accessible to biologists, I interpreted the condition for the emergence of cooperative breeding
in terms of inclusive fitness [12]. Because of the explicit nature of my model, I was also able to
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obtain novel results about the effect of breeder mortality. Specifically, changing breeding mor-
tality alters the expected time an auxiliary can serve as a productive helper, but also the amount
of time spent in the auxiliary class. Therefore, in some circumstances breeder mortality can
promote cooperation, and in others, hinder it.
Despite the large number of explanations for the emergence of cooperative breeding, lit-
tle has been done on the long-term evolutionary implications, or what constitutes an optimal
strategy. The few models that have looked at optimal strategies [6, 9], did so without consid-
ering population dynamics, an approach that can lead to ecologically unrealistic or misleading
results [11]. As a result, it is not known when existing theory for the emergence can or can-
not be used to predict the escalation of help, nor what the effect of ecology is upon optimal
strategies. Moreover, because the cost of helping is often paid asymmetrically by auxiliaries,
the long-term evolution of cooperative breeding has the potential for breeder-auxiliary conflict
over what the optimal strategy should be [6, 13], yet little has been done to examine this from
a theoretical perspective (but see [6]).
In Chapter 3, I examined the full evolutionary dynamics of cooperative breeding using a
population explicit model and the tools of adaptive dynamics. I was able to relate and extend
the predictions made by the ECH for the emergence of cooperative breeding to the expected
optimal strategy. In particular, I showed that provided helpers are making the best of a bad
situation [14], the constraints featured in the ECH can be used to predict the expected optimal
strategy similar to how the ECH intended them for emergence. However, when fitness returns
as an auxiliary exceed those of a breeder, the constraints of the ECH predicted to hinder the
emergence of helping function instead act to facilitate higher levels of optimal strategies. When
this occurs, cooperative breeding is not much of an evolutionary puzzle as cooperation is actu-
ally motivated by self-interest. Throughout this chapter, I juxtaposed the case in which helping
was under auxiliary control and the case in which helping was under maternal control, provid-
ing the scope for breeder-auxiliary conflict. I found that breeders always want auxiliaries to
provide help at a level higher than that which auxiliaries prefer, a result similar to that found
for scenarios involving dispersal [15, 16].
4.2 Future work
4.2.1 Breeder-auxiliary conflict
In Chapter 3, I looked at a simple breeder-auxiliary conflict. Part of the simplicity was because
the costs were paid solely by the auxiliary. This contributed to the breeder always wanting
auxiliaries to help at a higher level than that which the auxiliaries were willing to provide.
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However, there are other, more complicated potential trade-offs that could yield different re-
sults. For example, suppose that the rate at which a breeder produced oocytes dictated its
mortality rate. In such a scenario, increases in auxiliary help would hasten the death of the
breeder, and as such, it is possible that in some circumstances, a breeder would opt to sup-
press helping. Eviction is present in some cooperatively breeding species [17], so it is possible
that this conflict is a motivating factor in breeder eviction of helpful auxiliaries. An interest-
ing concept would be if territory inheritance were included in the model, as then the auxiliaries
could have the additional motivation to help at higher levels because the demise of their parents
would facilitate their own succession.
Another potential conflict could arise if I instead had explicitly modelled parental care.
To do so, I would have to add a third stage to the population, such that when individuals
are born, they enter an ‘offspring’ stage, during which breeder care and help by auxiliaries
would increase survivorship or accelerate maturation. Individuals would have to pass through
this maturation stage in order to become auxiliaries; once an auxiliary they could become
a potential helper. Obviously, providing care would come at a cost for both breeders and
auxiliaries, and so if breeders expect auxiliaries to help, they may lower the amount of care
they provide in response. This phenomenon is called ‘load-lightening’ and is present in many
cooperatively breeding avian species [18–20] and should yield considerable range for breeder-
auxiliary conflicts.
4.2.2 Co-evolution of helping and the sex-ratio
In many cooperatively breeding species, there is a sex-ratio bias towards the more helpful
sex [21]. The idea behind this behaviour is that helpers repay part of the cost of their production
by helping, which reduces the net cost of their production [22–24]. While a number of models
have examined the evolution of sex-ratios in cooperatively breeding populations [25, 26], no
work has been done on the co-evolution of helping and sex-ratio. As a result, the evolution of
sex-ratio bias in emerging cooperatively breeding systems is poorly understood from a theo-
retical perspective, and this has led to some confusion about what ecological conditions will
promote or suppress sex-ratio and helping co-evolution [24]. Modification of one of the models
used in this thesis to allow for the evolution of a second trait controlling sex would allow one
to address this topic.
References
[1] Heinsohn, R. & Legge, S., 1999 The cost of helping. Trends Ecol. Evol. 14, 53–57.
[2] Emlen, S., 1982 The evolution of helping I: An ecological constraints model. Am. Nat.
119, 29–39.
[3] Brown, J. L., 1987 Helping and Communal Breeding in Birds. Monographs in Behavior
and Ecology. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
[4] Covas, R. & Griesser, M., 2007 Life history and the evolution of family living in birds.
Proc. R. Soc. Lond. Ser. B-Biol. Sci. 274, 1349–1357.
[5] Arnold, K. E. & Owens, I. P. F., 1998 Cooperative breeding in birds: a comparative test
of the life history hypothesis. Proc. R. Soc. B-Biol. Sci. 265, 739–745.
[6] Emlen, S., 1982 The evolution of helping II: the role of behavioral conflict. Am. Nat. 119,
40–53.
[7] Hannon, S., Mumme, R., Koenig, W. & Pitelka, F., 1985 Replacement of breeders and
within-group conflict in the cooperatively breeding acorn woodpecker. Behav. Ecol. So-
ciobiol. 17, 303–312.
[8] Pruett-Jones, S. & Lewis, M., 1990 Sex-ratio and habitat limitation promote delayed
dispersal in superb fairy-wrens. Nature 348, 541–542.
[9] Motro, U., 1993 Helpers at parents nest - a game-theoretic approach. J. Theor. Biol. 163,
127–134.
[10] Reeve, H. K. & Ratnieks, F. L. W., 1993 Queen-queen conflicts in polygynous societies:
mutual tolerance and reproductive skew. In Queen Number and Sociality in Insects (ed.
L. Keller), pp. 45–85. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, UK.
[11] Pen, I. & Weissing, F. J., 2000 Towards a unified theory of cooperative breeding: the
role of ecology and life history re-examined. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. Ser. B-Biol. Sci. 267,
2411–2418.
[12] Hamilton, W. D., 1964 Genetical evolution of social behaviour. I and II. J. Theor. Biol. 7,
1–52.
[13] Russell, A. F. & Lummaa, V., 2009 Maternal effects in cooperative breeders: from hy-
menopterans to humans. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 364, 1143–1167.
58
REFERENCES 59
[14] Dickinson, J. L. & Hatchwell, B. J., 2004 The fitness consequences of helping. In Ecology
and Evolution of Cooperative Breeding in Birds (ed. Koenig, WD and Dickinson, JL).
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
[15] Frank, S. A., 1986 Dispersal polymorphisms in subdivided populations. J. Theor. Biol.
122, 303–309.
[16] Frank, S. A., 1998 Foundations of social evolution. Monographs in Behavior and Ecology.
Princeton University Press.
[17] Cant, M. A., Hodge, S. J., Bell, M. B. V., Gilchrist, J. S. & Nichols, H. J., 2010 Repro-
ductive control via eviction (but not the threat of eviction) in banded mongooses. Proc.
R. Soc. B-Biol. Sci. 277, 2219–2226.
[18] Hatchwell, B. J., 1999 Investment strategies of breeders in avian cooperative breeding
systems. Am. Nat 154, 205–219.
[19] Heinsohn, R. G., 2004 Parental care, load-lightening, and costs. In Ecology and Evolution
of Cooperative Breeding in Birds (ed. Koenig, W D and Dickinson, J L). Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
[20] Russell, A., Langmore, N. E., Gardner, J. L. & Kilner, R. M., 2008 Maternal investment
tactics in superb fairy-wrens. Proc. R. Soc. Lond., B 275, 29–36.
[21] Komdeur, J., 2004 Sex-ratio manipulation. In Ecology and Evolution of Cooperative
Breeding in Birds (ed. Koenig, WD and Dickinson, JL). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
[22] Trivers, R. & Willard, D., 1973 Natural-selection of parental ability to vary sex-ratio of
offspring. Science 179, 90–92.
[23] Emlen, S. T., Emlen, J. M. & Levin, S. A., 1986 Sex ratios in species with helpers-at-the-
nest. Am. Nat. 127.
[24] Koenig, W. & Walters, J., 1999 Sex-ratio selection in species with helpers at the nest: The
repayment model revisited. Am. Nat. 153, 124–130.
[25] Wild, G., 2006 Sex ratios when helpers stay at the nest. Evolution 60, 2012–2022.
[26] Pen, I. & Weissing, F. J., 2000 Sex-ratio optimization with helpers at the nest. Proc. R.
Soc. Lond. B 267, 539–543.
Appendix A
Derivation of mutant equations
In what follows I explain the derivation of the mutant equations from the main text. I use
all previously defined parameters, details of which are provided in the main text and are thus
omitted here for brevity.
Suppose there are two types of individuals, wild-type and heterozygous. Because the mu-
tant is rare, there are no homozygous mutant individuals and so I do not consider them here.
Suppose there is some large number, n, territories in the environment. Each territory contains
some variable number of auxiliaries, and has a single breeding site which can be either occu-
pied or unoccupied. Let I( j)i (t) denote the status of a breeder of type j ( j = 0 if wild-type, j = 1
if heterozygous) on patch i at time t, that is, if a breeder of type j is present, then I( j)i (t) = 1.
Otherwise, I( j)i (t) = 0. Similarly, let J
( j)
i (t) ≥ 0 denote the number of auxiliaries of type j ( j = 0
if wild-type, j = 1 if heterozygous) present on patch i at time t. Suppose a small increment
of time ∆t has elapsed. We now want to know the expected number and type of breeders and
auxiliaries on patch i at time t + ∆t.
First, the expected status of a heterozygous breeder on patch i at time t + ∆t after some
simplification is
E[I(1)i (t + ∆ t)| S ] − I(1)i (t)
∆ t
= −mx I(1)i (t) +
(
1 − I(0)i (t) − I(1)i (t)
) (1 − c) d˜
n
n∑
k=1
J(1)k (t) + O(∆t),
(A.1)
where I have divided through by ∆ t and let S denote the state of the n patches at time t.
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Likewise, the expected number of heterozygous auxiliaries on the i-th patch at time t + ∆ t is
E[J(1)i (t + ∆ t)| S ] − J(1)i (t)
∆ t
= −m˜yJ(1)i (t) − J(1)i (t)
d˜
n
n∑
k=1
(
1 − I(0)k (t) − I(1)k (t)
)
+
(
b + h J(1)i (t)
) I(0)i (t) ∑k I(1)k (t)∑
k
(
I(0)k (t) + I
(1)
k (t)
) + 1
2
I(1)i (t)
 + O(∆ t). (A.2)
Now, in order to have a closed system of differential equations describing the mutant population
dynamics, I must also keep track of the cross products I(1)i (t) J
(1)
i (t) and I
(0)
i (t) J
(1)
i (t) and their
expected values at time t+∆ t (notice that I(1)i (t) I
(1)
i (t) = I
(1)
i (t) by definition). After some trivial
reduction and dividing through by ∆ t, the cross products can be formulated as
E[I(1)i (t + ∆ t) J
(1)
i (t + ∆ t)| S ] − I(1)i (t) J(1)i (t)
∆ t
= −
(
mx + m˜y
)
I(1)i (t) J
(1)
i (t)
+ J(1)i (t)
(
1 − I(0)i (t) − I(1)i (t)
) (1 − c) d˜
n
∑
k
J(1)k (t) +
1
2
(
b + h J(1)i (t)
)
I(1)i (t)
− I(1)i (t) J(1)i (t)
d˜
n
∑
k
(
1 − I(0)k (t) − I(1)k (t)
)
+ O(∆ t), (A.3)
and
E[I(0)i (t + ∆ t) J
(1)
i (t + ∆ t)| S ] − I(0)i (t) J(1)i (t)
∆ t
= −
(
mx + m˜y
)
I(0)i (t) J
(1)
i (t)
+ J(1)i (t)
(
1 − I(0)i (t) − I(1)i (t)
) (1 − c) d˜
n
∑
k
J(1)k (t) − I(0)i (t) J(1)i (t)
d˜
n
∑
k
(
1 − I(0)k (t) − I(1)k (t)
)
+
1
2
(
b + h J(1)i (t)
)
I(0)i (t)
∑
k I
(1)
k (t)∑
k
(
I(0)k (t) + I
(1)
k (t)
) + O(∆ t). (A.4)
The reader might be confused as to why the death of the breeder and the death of an auxiliary
appear to have the same magnitude of effect, other than the different per-capita rate constants.
The reason is that because the derivation is reliant upon initial and final states, which after
reduction yields the same answer. To see this, if I write out the change in state in full, the
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probability a breeder dies is
mx ∆ t I
( j)
i (t)
([
I( j)i (t) − 1
]
J(1)i (t) − I( j)i (t) J(1)i (t)
)
= −mx ∆ t I( j)i (t) J(1)i (t), (A.5)
whereas the probability an auxiliary dies is
m˜y ∆ t J
(1)
i (t)
(
I( j)i (t)
[
J(1)i (t) − 1
]
− I( j)i (t) J(1)i (t)
)
= −m˜y ∆ t I( j)i (t) J(1)i (t), (A.6)
where the term in the round brackets is the change in state. Hence, all that distinguishes the
two is the per-capita multiplier rate. Now, let Xm(t) =
∑
i
I(1)i (t)
n , X(t) =
∑
i
I(0)i (t)
n , Ym(t) =
∑
i
J(1)i (t)
n ,
Y =
∑
i
J(0)i (t)
n , Zm(t) =
∑
i
I(1)i (t) J
(1)
i (t)
n , and Z˜m(t) =
∑
i
I(0)i (t) J
(1)
i (t)
n . Then summing the previous
equations from i = 1, ..., n, dividing through by n and taking the limit as ∆ t → 0, I obtain
X˙m = −mx Xm + d˜ (1 − c) (1 − X − Xm)Ym,
Y˙m = −m˜y Ym − d˜ (1 − X − Xm)Ym + 12
(
b X + h Z˜m
) Xm
X + Xm
+
1
2
(b Xm + h Zm) ,
Z˙m = −
(
mx + m˜y
)
Zm +
(
Ym − Z˜m − Zm
)
(1 − c) d˜ Ym + 12 (b Xm + h Zm) − Zmd˜ (1 − X − Xm) ,
˙˜Zm = −
(
mx + m˜y
)
Z˜m +
(
Ym − Z˜m − Zm
)
(1 − c) d˜ Ym + 12
(
b X + h Z˜m
) Xm
X + Xm
− Z˜md˜ (1 − X − Xm) ,
where dots denote differentiation with respect to time t. When the mutant is rare and the
population is at the wild-type equilibria, X = X¯, and we ignore higher order terms of Xm and
Ym. Then, this system can be non-dimensionalized and linearized about the MFE to give the
system in the main text. Z˜m is omitted from that version because the eigenvalue associated with
it is always strictly negative.
Appendix B
Higher-order evolutionary dynamics
B.1 Evolutionary stability
The optimal strategies given in the main text represent regions of phenotype space where the
local fitness gradient is equal to zero. To determine whether they are fitness minima or maxima
requires checking the Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) condition [1, 2]. An ESS strategy is
a strategy which satisfies
∂2λ (b1, b0)
∂b21
∣∣∣∣∣∣
b1=b0=b∗
< 0. (B.1)
Recall that λ (b1, b0) is the invasion function. Following the procedure steps in (B.1), the strat-
egy for maternal control is ESS provided
d2µ(b)
db2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
b=b∗
> 0 (B.2)
That is, provided the costs of helping accelerate with increasing help, the singular strategy is
stable under maternal control. On the other hand, when help is under under auxiliary control,
the optimal strategy is ESS provided
0 < −1
2
∂2
∂b21
[
(1 − c) φ
µ(b1) + φ
2
µB
]
b1=b0=b∗
+
1
8
d2µ(b1)
db21
∣∣∣∣∣∣
b1=b∗
b∗
(µ(b∗) + φ)2
(B.3)
In this case, it is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for (B.2) to hold. Because (B.3)
does not hold for all µ(b) satisfying (B.2), maternally control is stable over a larger region of
ecological space. There is a second condition required to ensure that (3.31) is a terminal point
of evolution; this is given by the so-called convergence stability condition [3]. Convergence
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stability is often of interest because there exist stability conditions under which a singular strat-
egy is an evolutionary branching point [2], however, as I assumed random mating, speciation
is not possible in my model [4].
B.2 Convergence stability
For convergence stability, we require that
d
db0
[
∂λ (b1, b0)
∂b1
∣∣∣∣∣
b1=b0
]
b0=b∗
< 0. (B.4)
Proceeding in this fashion for auxiliary control of helping, and after substituting b1 = b0 into
the first derivative, I obtain
∂λ
∂b1
∣∣∣∣∣
b1=b0
=
1
µ(b0) + φ
(
1
4
T − dµ(b0)
db0
(
1 − 3
4
T
(1 − c) φ
µ(b0) + φ
b0
µB
A¯
B¯
))
(B.5)
Define
ζ =
1
4
T − dµ(b0)
db0
(
1 − 3
4
T
(1 − c) φ
µ(b0) + φ
b0
µB
A¯
B¯
)
(B.6)
By definition of the optimal strategy, ζ |b0=b∗ = 0. Therefore for CSS we are only concerned
with the sign of dζdb0 |b0=b∗ . That is
dζ
db0
∣∣∣∣∣
b0=b∗
= − d
2µ(b0)
db20
∣∣∣∣∣∣
b0=b∗
+ 12
dµ(b0)
db0
∣∣∣∣∣3
b0=b∗
(1 − c) φ
(µ(b∗) + φ)2
1
µB
+ 3
dµ(b0)
db0
∣∣∣∣∣2
b0=b∗
b∗
(µ(b∗) + φ)2
(1 − c) φ
κ + B¯
dB¯
db¯0
∣∣∣∣∣∣
b0=b∗
− 4 dµ(b)
db
∣∣∣∣∣2
b=b∗
1
κ1
dA¯
db¯0
∣∣∣∣∣∣
b0=b∗
(B.7)
If this is satisfied, and (B.3) is not, then branching is possible.
Now, consider maternal control. Proceeding as above, I obtain
d
db0
[
∂λ(b1, b0)
∂b1
∣∣∣∣∣
b1=b0
]
b0=b∗
= − 1
µ(b∗) + φ
 d2µ(b0)db20
∣∣∣∣∣∣
b0=b∗
+
κ1
(κ1 + A¯)2
dA¯
db0
∣∣∣∣∣∣
b0=b∗
 . (B.8)
Obviously dA¯db is strictly increasing. Therefore, all accelerating functions of µ(b) satisfy the
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convergence stability condition. Branching is possible if µ(b) is decelerating and
− d
2µ(b0)
db20
∣∣∣∣∣∣
b0=b∗
>
κ1
(κ1 + A¯)2
dA¯
db0
∣∣∣∣∣∣
b0=b∗
. (B.9)
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